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False Positivism:  
The Failure of the Newest Originalism 
Guha Krishnamurthi*  
Originalism is a juggernaut. It pervades our constitutional discourse, 
and it has become a fort and font of constitutional legitimacy. A number 
of our most prominent jurists and legal thinkers are self-described 
originalists and, in myriad constitutional cases, originalist argumentation 
demands our serious attention. Notwithstanding, originalists have 
struggled to forge any meaningful consensus on the most foundational 
issues. Among the serious problems, originalist theories have each 
struggled to navigate between preserving core features and fixed stars 
 of our law and remaining a distinctive theory with fidelity to  
“original meaning.” 
The newest effort in this struggle is the so-called “positive” turn in 
originalism. Positivist originalism seeks to refocus constitutional 
interpretation from normative questions—about morality, linguistics, 
interpretation, and authority—to what the law actually is, as embodied by 
our legal practice. This focus, we are told, comes from H.L.A. Hart’s legal 
positivism—a theory of law based on social facts and the actual behavior 
of officials in the legal system. The resulting positivist originalism—which 
contends that our law includes the original precepts and methods of the 
founding era—promises to provide historical and empirical conditions for 
the validation of our law, without appeal to theoretical questions about  
the law. 
The project of positivist originalism fails. I proffer four criticisms of 
positivist originalism: First, positivist originalism’s commitments 
contravene key insights of legal positivism. Second, positivist originalism, 
and its real-world formulation called original-law originalism, do not 
actually describe our practice of law (or do so trivially). Third, the 
methodology of positivist originalism cannot sustain its conclusion, in 
 
 *  Assistant Professor, South Texas College of Law. I would like to thank Daniel 
Aguilar, Susannah Barton Tobin, Charles Barzun, Mitchell Berman, Joshua Braver, Ryan 
William Copus, Erik Encarnacion, Mark Graber, Charanya Krishnaswami, Brian Leiter, the 
Honorable Goodwin H. Liu, Alexander Platt, Peter Salib, Eric Segall, Larry Solum, Simon 
Stern, Mark Tushnet, and Eric Vogelstein. All errors and omissions are mine. D.C. Makinson, 
Paradox of the Preface, 25 ANALYSIS 205, 205–07 (1965). 
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light of the facts that our obligation to follow the law is at best qualified 
and because there are equally good competing theories describing our law. 
Fourth, beyond these internal flaws, positivist originalism fails to solve 
any of the problems that have continually plagued the originalist 
enterprise. Thus, the project of positivist originalism cannot fulfill its aims 
and is unlikely to do so without appealing to the very theoretical questions 
it was devised to avoid. 
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Originalism is a juggernaut. It pervades our constitutional 
discourse, and it has become a fort and font of constitutional 
legitimacy. A number of our most prominent jurists and legal 
thinkers are self-described originalists and, in myriad 
constitutional cases, originalist argumentation demands our 
serious attention.1 Notwithstanding, originalists have struggled to 
forge a consensus on the most foundational issues.2 
 
 1. Indeed, at least five of the current active Supreme Court Justices have explained 
that they follow originalist jurisprudence or described themselves as originalists. See Jack M. 
Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 669 n.66 (2013) 
(“Justice Thomas describes himself as an original meaning originalist . . . .”);  
Neil M. Gorsuch, Justice Neil Gorsuch: Why Originalism Is the Best Approach to the Constitution, 
TIME (Sept. 6, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://time.com/5670400/justice-neil-gorsuch-why-
originalism-is-the-best-approach-to-the-constitution/ (arguing that originalism is the best 
approach to constitutional interpretation); Matthew Walther, Sam Alito: A Civil Man, AM. 
SPECTATOR (Apr. 21, 2014, 12:00 AM), https://spectator.org/sam-alito-a-civil-man/  
(quoting Justice Alito saying he was a “practical originalist”); The Nomination of Elena Kagan 
to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 62 (2010), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
111shrg67622/pdf/CHRG-111shrg67622.pdf (Justice Kagan stating “we are all originalists”); 
Eric J. Segall, Judicial Originalism as Myth, VOX (Feb. 27, 2017, 10:10 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/2/27/14747562/originalism-gorsuch-scalia-
brown-supreme-court (“Six years ago, one of our most liberal justices, Elena Kagan, stated 
during her confirmation hearing that ‘we are all originalists.’”); Supreme Court Nominee Brett 
Kavanaugh Confirmation Hearing, Day 2, Part 2, C-SPAN, 1:59:45–1:59:56 (Sept. 5, 2018), 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?449705-10/supreme-court-nominee-brett-kavanaugh-
confirmation-hearing-day-2-part-2&start=7167 (then-nominee Kavanaugh responding to 
Senator Michael Shumway Lee that he is an originalist). What the Justices precisely mean by 
originalism is up for question. Justice Kagan likely means something different from Justice 
Thomas, in that Justice Kagan likely does not mean that original meaning is lexically prior to 
all other considerations. But what is evident is that originalism occupies such an important 
role in constitutional jurisprudence that judges, and potential judges, feel compelled to 
identify with it. 
Moreover, the Federalist Society, which is often characterized by its commitment to 
originalism, has been extremely influential in the selection of court of appeals and district 
court judges. See, e.g., Charles R. Kesler, Thinking About Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 1121, 1121 (2008) (“If the Federalist Society is associated with a single word, it is 
‘originalism.’”); David Montgomery, Conquerors of the Courts, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/magazine/wp/2019/01/02/feature/conqueror
s-of-the-courts/ (discussing the huge impact of the Federalist Society on the lower courts). 
 2. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009) 
[hereinafter Berman, Originalism Is Bunk]; Joel Alicea & Donald L. Drakeman, The Limits of 
New Originalism, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1161 (2013); Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith,  
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Originalists have struggled to agree upon the proper object of 
original meaning—for example, among the framers’ intentions, the 
ratifiers’ intentions and understandings, and the public’s 
understanding. Indeed, for each of these candidate originalist 
objects, there are strong objections to their feasibility, including in 
their epistemic accessibility and their connection with any 
normative good that we wish to further or preserve.3 
Enmeshed in that debate about originalist object is the question 
about the strength of the originalist thesis. Are originalists merely 
saying that we must pay some attention to original meaning; that 
we should give strong, presumptive weight to original meaning; 
that we should first decide cases solely on the basis of original 
meaning, and only then appeal to other considerations? Depending 
on the answer to the question of strength, originalism may reduce 
to being uncontroversial but trivially true, or it may be a robust 
contention that has proven hard to justify.4 
Moreover, there is the overarching question about the nature  
of the justification for originalism: Is originalism conceptually  
the only way to engage in interpretation of the Constitution?  
Or is it simply that originalism achieves the best consequentialist 
results, in terms of stability, notice, predictability, and cabining 
judicial discretion? On this front, whichever road originalists  
have chosen, there has been a long queue of challenges 
undercutting both the conceptual and consequentialist arguments 
proffered for originalism.5 
 
Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239 (2009) [hereinafter Colby & Smith, Living Originalism]; 
Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713 (2011) [hereinafter 
Colby, New Originalism]; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Are Originalist Constitutional Theories 
Principled, or Are They Rationalizations for Conservatism?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5 (2011); 
Eric Berger, Originalism’s Pretenses, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 329 (2013); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
The Political Function of Originalist Ambiguity, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 487, 492 (1996). 
 3. Colby & Smith, Living Originalism, supra note 2, at 248–52 (discussing the history 
of the various objects of original meaning). 
 4. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, supra note 2, at 10–12, 17–24 (discussing the various 
positions on the “strength” of originalism). 
 5. Id. at 52–56, 60–65 (offering objections to conceptual arguments for originalism); 
JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 10–11 (1996) (explaining that originalism cannot often establish a fixed 
meaning, thus undercutting many of the consequential benefits); Thomas B. Colby,  
The Federal Marriage Amendment and the False Promise of Originalism, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 529, 
586–99 (2008) (same). 
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Among all of these, one problem for originalism has proven 
particularly pressing: Does originalism—with a focus on 
understandings of the world from over 230 years ago6—cohere 
with, account for, and preserve the core features and commitments 
of our legal system and society? The question is especially 
demanding given societal evolution on issues of individual 
freedom and identity, race, class, sex, gender, and sexual 
orientation, all in the light of modernity and technology. 
In light of these steep challenges, a new wave of originalism—
called “positivist originalism”—has arisen.7 The scholars behind 
positivist originalism, William Baude and Stephen E. Sachs, explain 
that the animating principle is to refocus the principal question of 
constitutional interpretation. Instead of asking whether 
interpretive theories have benefits in terms of values, such as 
“democratic self-governance, the rule of law, stability, 
predictability, [and] efficiency,” Baude and Sachs claim that we 
should instead focus on what the law is, as embodied by our legal 
practice.8 They claim that, by attending to how we practice law, we 
can generate a specific theory of our law—called “original-law 
originalism”—that remains faithful to the original law and original 
methods of interpreting the law while accounting for our core legal 
commitments. This, we are told, comes from a study of legal 
positivism, particularly of the variety espoused by H.L.A. Hart, 
which asserts that we understand what the law is by examining 
social facts and the actual behavior of the officials of our legal 
system. Most importantly, Baude and Sachs claim that in doing this, 
we can arrive at historical, empirical validation criteria for the law 
while bypassing theoretical questions about morality, meaning, 
interpretation, or authority. 
 
 6. Some forms of originalism may recognize that the Reconstruction Era profoundly 
change the Constitution, such that the original meaning may take foot in that period instead. 
Even still, the question remains whether we should look to understandings from over 150 
years ago. 
 7. See, e.g., William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Grounding Originalism, 113 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1455 (2019) [hereinafter Baude & Sachs, Grounding Originalism]; William Baude & 
Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism and the Law of the Past, 37 L. & HIST. REV. 809 (2019); William 
Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349 (2015) [hereinafter Baude, Is 
Originalism Our Law?]; Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 817 (2015) [hereinafter Sachs, Legal Change]; William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, 
Originalism’s Bite, 20 GREEN BAG 2D 103 (2016) [hereinafter Baude & Sachs, Originalism’s Bite]. 
 8. Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, supra note 7, at 2351 (quoting Berman, Originalism 
Is Bunk, supra note 2, at 38). 
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Myriad scholars, including Charles Barzun, Mark Greenberg, 
Richard Primus, and Eric Segall, have presented robust challenges 
to the project of positivist originalism. Barzun and Greenberg have 
shown that Baude and Sachs’s theory of positivist originalism 
underspecifies the legal positivist theory of law supporting it, that 
the choice is of significant consequence, and that choice implicates 
the very theoretical questions Baude and Sachs suggest they can 
avoid.9 Primus shows that the evidence that Baude relies upon, 
primarily judicial opinion language, cannot sustain positivist 
originalism, because insofar as that privileges constitutional 
discourse over constitutional decision-making, that cannot arise 
from a focus on practice alone.10 And Segall contends that original-
law originalism has little relevance to the actual practice of law, 
especially the Supreme Court, where political ideology is most 
operative in deciding cases.11 
Building upon these critiques, I contend that positivist 
originalism and original-law originalism fail in their aims and that 
they cannot succeed without an appeal to the very theoretical 
questions they were designed to circumvent. In this Article, I make 
four principal claims: 
First, positivist originalism fails to heed key insights of legal 
positivism. Legal positivism tells us that the law is determined by 
the social facts. Positivist originalism and original-law originalism 
focus on judicial decisions and opinion language. But they fail to 
consider other relevant social facts—for example, judges’ 
commitments to broad goals of our polity, like democracy and 
efficiency. These implicate theoretical questions about the law that 
help determine how officials act and thus must be part of the 
inquiry of what our law is. 
Second, as a factual matter, positivist originalism and original-
law originalism either fail to describe our current law or do so 
trivially. Historically, our practice of law was very different at the 
time of the founding. Indeed, our understanding of precedent and 
stare decisis—which undergird the common law—has evolved 
 
 9. See, e.g., Charles L. Barzun, The Positive U-Turn, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1323 (2017);  
Mark Greenberg, What Makes a Method of Legal Interpretation Correct? Legal Standards vs. 
Fundamental Determinants, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 105 (2017). 
 10. See Richard Primus, Is Theocracy Our Politics?, 116 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 44 (2016). 
 11. See Eric J. Segall, Originalism off the Ground: A Response to Professors Baude and Sachs, 
34 CONST. COMMENT. 313 (2019). 
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greatly since the founding era. Original-law originalism is defined 
to include the original meaning of the Constitution plus original 
methods of interpreting the Constitution. Understood literally, 
however, original-law originalism does not describe our law, 
because our current practice of applying precedent and stare decisis 
is not an original method of interpreting the Constitution. And, if 
viewed more expansively, the original-law originalist methodology 
seems to describe the approach of every case without providing any 
meaningful validation or falsification criteria for whether a case 
was decided correctly. This capaciousness should be unwelcome 
for both clear-thinking nonoriginalists and originalists. Moreover, 
the putative positive evidence for original-law originalism is 
inconclusive at best. And, indeed, the fact that there were 
constitutional “interregna”—times where the Constitution was not 
interpreted pursuant to original-law originalism—reveals that our 
law is not original-law originalism. 
Third, even deriving some moral obligation to continue our 
practice of law will not sustain positivist originalism and original-
law originalism, due to the presence of other relevant legal 
considerations and other competing theories. Granting normative 
weight to actual practice, the strongest conclusion to draw is that 
there is a prima facie obligation to follow our practice. But that is 
too weak to sustain original-law originalism because if other legal 
considerations can trump the purported original law, then that 
theory reduces to a form of pluralism. Moreover, there are other 
interpretive theories that model the law just as well, if not better, 
and so picking between the theories will inevitably require an 
appeal to theoretical debates. 
Fourth, positivist originalism and original-law originalism offer 
no progress in responding to the main problems facing originalism. 
The first problem is the motivation for originalism. Originalists 
have proffered conceptual and consequentialist arguments, which 
in turn have been challenged. Positivist originalism offers no path 
forward in repairing these arguments and solidifying the 
foundational motivation for originalism. The second problem for 
originalism is whether it preserves key features of our law.  
Here too positivist originalism and original-law originalism fail  
to provide meaningful conditions to recognize what the law is,  
and thus these theories cannot recognize what is our law.  
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Most strikingly, these theories cannot even tell us that cases like 
Korematsu, Plessy v. Ferguson, and Lochner are not part of our law. 
This Article proceeds in six parts. First, in Part I, I proffer a brief 
history of originalism’s evolution, along with an account of some of 
the main problems with originalism as a theory of interpretation. 
Then in Part II, I set forth the frame and contours of positivist 
originalism and original-law originalism. Thereafter, I offer my 
principal responses to positivist originalism and original-law 
originalism: In Part III, I argue that positivist originalism and 
original-law originalism are not positivist theories and that their 
methodology brings nothing new to understanding the law.  
In Part IV, I contend that positivist originalism and original-law 
originalism are either false or trivially true in modeling our law.  
In Part V, I demonstrate that original-law originalism cannot be 
sustained by its own logical conclusion and requires appeal to 
theoretical questions to justify it over competing theories.  
In Part VI, I show that positivist originalism and original-law 
originalism make no headway in solving the existing problems  
for originalism. 
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF ORIGINALISM 
A. The Evolution from Old to New 
Originalism grew out of a discontent with the so-called judicial 
activism of the Warren Court, especially in the wake of  
Roe v. Wade.12 A new wave of scholars and jurists, including Robert 
H. Bork, Justice William H. Rehnquist, Attorney General Edwin 
Meese III, and Raoul Berger all wrote important pieces criticizing 
the supposed judicial activism in favor of methods of interpretation 
that would instead grasp at the original intentions of the 
Constitution.13 In determining these intentions, early scholars of 
originalism focused on the intent of the framers and ratifiers of the 
 
 12. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s 
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1134 (2003) [hereinafter Kesavan & Paulsen,  
The Interpretive Force]; Colby & Smith, Living Originalism, supra note 2, at 247. The term 
“originalism” itself was created by Paul Brest. See Earl M. Maltz, The Failure of Attacks on 
Constitutional Originalism, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 43, 56 n.1 (1987) (citing Paul Brest,  
The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980)). 
 13. Kesavan & Paulsen, The Interpretive Force, supra note 12, at 1134–35; Colby & Smith, 
Living Originalism, supra note 2, at 248. 
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Constitution.14 This generated pressing questions: How do we 
understand collective intention, what to do when framer and 
ratifier intentions conflict, at what level of generality should 
intention be understood, and what if the relevant intentions were 
self-referentially not intended to control?15 
This led some to shift the focus from original intent to original 
understanding—namely, that of the ratifiers.16 This move was 
principally motivated by the fact it was the ratifiers who gave the 
Constitution legal force, but it also purported to alleviate a few 
problems with the focus on intent, in terms of conflicts between 
framers and ratifiers and the subjectivity of and difficulty in 
ascertaining intentions, as opposed to understanding.17 
Another solution to the question of what was the object of 
originalist interpretation was a move from a focus on the ratifiers 
and their understanding of the Constitution to a focus on the public 
at large and the original public meaning of the Constitution.18 The 
foremost proponent of this variety of originalism was Justice 
Antonin Scalia.19 This move was in part motivated by the fact that 
it was the public, and not the ratifiers alone, that gave the document 
legal force and so the focus should be on what the public 
understood the Constitution to be.20 It also had other supposed 
benefits in further allowing originalists to disentangle themselves 
from the subjective and epistemically difficult inquiry about what 
the ratifiers believed, instead with a focus on what a hypothetical 
objective reader of the Constitution would have understood it  
 
 14. Kesavan & Paulsen, The Interpretive Force, supra note 12, at 1135; Colby & Smith, 
Living Originalism, supra note 2, at 248. 
 15. Kesavan & Paulsen, The Interpretive Force, supra note 12, at 1135–37; Colby & Smith, 
Living Originalism, supra note 2, at 248. 
 16. Kesavan & Paulsen, The Interpretive Force, supra note 12, at 1137–39; Colby & Smith, 
Living Originalism, supra note 2, at 250. 
 17. Kesavan & Paulsen, The Interpretive Force, supra note 12, at 1137–39; Colby & Smith, 
Living Originalism, supra note 2, at 250–52. 
 18. Kesavan & Paulsen, The Interpretive Force, supra note 12, at 1140–42; Colby & Smith, 
Living Originalism, supra note 2, at 250–52. 
 19. Antonin Scalia, Address Before the Attorney General’s Conference on Economic 
Liberties (June 14, 1986), in OFF. OF LEGAL POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ORIGINAL MEANING 
JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK app. C (1987). 
 20. See, e.g., Ian Bartrum, Two Dogmas of Originalism, 7 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 157, 182 
(2015) (explaining this justification for original public meaning). 
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to mean.21 But there remained substantial debate on how we learn 
what the original public meaning is.22 In particular, there were 
questions about whether to consider framer intent and ratifier 
understanding at all in ascertaining the original public meaning.23 
Alongside the moves from original intent to original meaning 
and from subjective meaning to objective meaning, there have been 
many other theoretical moves in the development of a “new” 
originalism: “the move from actual to hypothetical understanding; 
[] the embrace of standards and general principles; [] the embrace 
of broad levels of generality; [] the move from original expected 
application to original objective principles; [] the distinction 
between interpretation and construction; and [] the distinction 
between normative and semantic originalism.”24 These have 
translated into different conceptions of originalism’s nature: 
whether it is the only permissible theory of legal interpretation as a 
conceptual matter, or whether it is contingently the best theory, 
given our commitments and empirical facts about the world.25 
 
 21. Kesavan & Paulsen, The Interpretive Force, supra note 12, at 1140–42; Colby & Smith, 
Living Originalism, supra note 2, at 250–52. 
 22. Colby & Smith, Living Originalism, supra note 2, at 252–55. 
 23. Id. at 254. 
 24. Colby, New Originalism, supra note 2, at 719–20. 
In the interest of brevity, and because it has been ably done by Thomas Colby, Mitch 
Berman, and Stephen Griffin, among others, I have said little about the new originalism.  
See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1188–92 (2008). 
But among the theory’s main exponents are Keith Whittington, Randy Barnett, Lawrence 
Solum, and Jack Balkin. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 599 (2004); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 
(1999); Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law, Ill. Pub. Law & 
Legal Theory Research Paper Series, No. 07-24, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244; Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living 
Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549 (2009). 
 25. To be sure, originalism itself is not one “thing”; there are many different 
originalisms. As Mitchell N. Berman observes, there are at least four dimensions on which 
originalist theories may differ. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, supra note 2, at 9–14. The first is 
object—what an originalist theory focuses on as conveying original meaning, like framers’ 
intent, ratifiers’ understanding, and original public meaning. Id. at 9–10. The next is 
strength—how important original meaning is in determining the law. It could be the sole 
consideration in determining the law, the lexically prior consideration in determining the 
law, the presumptive determinant of the law, a weight consideration in determining the law, 
or simply a consideration of determining the law. Id. at 10–12. Another basis is status—the 
nature of the originalist claim. Originalist theories may maintain that interpretation should 
look to the original meaning because, as a contingent matter, it is beneficial, or that 
interpretation should look to original meaning because it is conceptually necessary, for 
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Of course, theories that assert that the originalist object of 
original public meaning of the text must merit some, but not 
necessarily dispositive, consideration in interpretation do little to 
distinguish originalism from any other type of constitutional 
interpretation.26 It is a completely uncontroversial claim that 
original meaning plays some role in interpretation. No other 
plausible theory of constitutional interpretation says otherwise. 
So, for originalism to be a distinct theory of constitutional 
interpretation it must be stronger than that, and most clear-thinking 
originalists recognize this. But there are still a variety of options for 
the originalist. As suggested above, originalists may hold that 
original meaning is the sole and exclusive consideration, that it is 
the lexically prior consideration, that it is a presumptively 
dispositive consideration, or that it is a weighty consideration.27 
Depending on the details, the latter two—presumptive and 
weighty originalism—may lead such an originalism back into the 
anodyne and uncontroversial, because it is firmly ensconced in our 
legal tradition that we “begin [or start] with the text” of the thing 
being interpreted, whether that be a statute, regulation, treaty,  
or constitution.28 However that debate shakes out, the  
important point is that to be a distinct, meaningful theory of 
constitutional interpretation, originalism must be sufficiently 
strong—it must significantly privilege original meaning above 
other considerations.29 
For clarity, I will refer to these varieties of originalism 
collectively as “normative originalism.” To be sure, the term is not 
intended to be monolithic, and it is not intended to exclude theories 
that appeal to positive facts. But the critical feature of positivist 
 
examples. Id. at 12–14. Finally, there is subject—who the originalist thesis applies to. It could 
be that it is just a judicial doctrine, a doctrine for officials, or for all people. Id. at 14. As a 
consequence, Berman suggests that this may lead to over 72 different prima facie plausible 
accounts of originalism. Id. 
 26. See Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, supra note 2, at 10 n.21. 
 27. Id. at 10–12.   
 28. Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856 (2016) (“Statutory interpretation, as we always 
say, begins with the text . . . .”); Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 562 U.S. 195, 204 (2011) 
(“Our analysis begins with the text of Regulation Z in effect at the time this dispute arose.”); 
Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008) (“The interpretation of a treaty, like the 
interpretation of a statute, begins with its text.”); Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 
1965 (2019) (“We start with the text of the Fifth Amendment.”). 
 29. Indeed, Berman argues that originalism must be the exclusive or lexical prior 
variants. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, supra note 2, at 22. 
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originalism is its positive focus, and thus “normative originalism” 
is intended to encompass the complement of originalist theories. 
B. The Principal Arguments for and Against Originalism 
A key question for originalism—and indeed for any 
interpretive methodology—is its purpose. To this end, normative 
originalists have offered conceptual or metaphysical arguments 
and consequentialist arguments for its adoption. 
The conceptual or metaphysical arguments for originalism 
contend that originalism is necessary based on the nature of 
constitutional interpretation, the writtenness of the Constitution, or 
the nature of constitutional authority.30 But such arguments have 
proven a shaky foundation for the originalist enterprise.31 
 
 30. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, supra note 2, at 39 (discussing the argument from 
intentionalism); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL 
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 47–61 (1999) (discussing the argument 
from writtenness); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Interpreting the Constitution in Its Second Century,  
24 MELB. U. L. REV. 677, 683 (2000) (proffering an argument from constitutional structure  
and authority). 
 31. For example, according to Whittington’s argument from the writtenness of the 
Constitution, the Constitution was devised in response and in contrast to an English system 
that did not adequately preserve rights. WHITTINGTON, supra note 30, at 50–53. This was in 
part because of the lack of fixedness and the consequent malleability of the English 
constitution. The framers believed that reducing the Constitution to writing—which 
conveyed the relevant authorial intent of the Constitution—would help enforce those rights. 
Id. at 51. And thus, based on the very purposes of the Constitution, the original meaning of 
the Constitution—that is, the authorial intent—should govern the interpretation of the 
Constitution. Id. at 59–61. 
A compelling response to Whittington’s argument is that the written Constitution 
could have sought to enforce those rights through some pathway other than directly through 
the original meaning. As Whittington himself observes, the Constitution could have been 
conceived of as “a fixed referent for political debate, a promissory note, or as essentially 
indeterminate.” Id. at 62. In these avatars, originalism may not be the correct mode of 
constitutional interpretation, because it may be that other factors and facts, other than the 
original meaning of the Constitution, are relevant to its interpretation. 
Whittington responds that these different conceptions of the Constitution are “easily 
assimilated into originalism.” Id. at 78. Whittington’s point is seemingly that if the 
Constitution was conceived differently, then that would be the original meaning of the 
Constitution and that is rightly the focus of our constitutional interpretation. But suppose 
the Constitution becomes a fixed political referent and it functions appropriately, despite the 
original intentions of the framers. Then the Constitution could simply continue to operate as 
a fixed political referent. Furthermore, and perhaps more relevantly, under a conception of 
the original meaning of the Constitution as a malleable fixed political referent, constitutional 
interpretation may just look very much like any other kind of nonoriginalism—taking into 
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Other arguments for normative originalism are steeped in the 
contingent consequences that arise from it. Principally, the claim is 
that originalism, in focusing on original meaning, provides a fixed 
point that is objectively knowable and equally and easily 
accessible—which in turn provide notice, predictability, and 
stability.32 That fixed point provides a gauge to assess and cabin 
exercises of judicial discretion.33 In Whittington’s words, 
[T]he central problem of constitutional theory was how to prevent 
judges from acting as legislators and substituting their own 
substantive political preferences and values for those of the 
people and their elected representatives. . . . By rooting judges in 
the firm ground of text, history, well-accepted historical 
traditions, and the like, originalists hoped to discipline them.34 
 
account a plethora of other factors, facts, and norms of argumentation other than  
original meaning. 
Beyond that, it is also unclear and underspecified how much fixedness and lack of 
malleability the framers—or more accurately some subset of the framers—wanted. It might 
have been that they desired some level of fixedness, but still wished to maintain some 
flexibility. For that, perhaps another method of fixation, for example, that takes into account 
something more than original meaning, might have been sufficient. 
Other such arguments for originalism fail for similar reasons, in my estimation.  
See, e.g., Goldsworthy, supra note 30, at 683 (arguing that the structure of the Constitution, 
with explicit grants of power and an amendment process, requires fidelity to original 
meaning in interpretation); Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, supra note 2, at 39 (discussing the 
argument from intentionalism and providing a fulsome response to these “hard” arguments 
for originalism). 
 32. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, Att’y Gen., Speech Before the American Bar Association, 
in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 1, 9 (Federalist Soc’y 1986) 
(“By seeking to judge policies in light of principles, rather than remold principles in light of 
policies, the Court could avoid both the charge of incoherence and the charge of being either 
too conservative or two [sic] liberal.”); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in 
Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 290 n.320 
(1988) (“The rules issuing from original intentions adjudication will be more knowable and 
more stable than those from any other plausible model of judicial review.”); Jack M. Balkin, 
Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 429 (2007); Randy 
E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not As Radical As It Sounds, 22 CONST. 
COMMENT. 257, 259 (2005); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power 
to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 551–52 (1994). 
 33. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights,  
23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 825 (1986) (defending originalism on the basis of its “capacity to 
control judges”); see also ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 12 (1992) 
(discussing the benefit of cabining judicial discretion); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser 
Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863–64 (1989). 
 34. Whittington, supra note 24, at 602. 
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Indeed, Thomas Colby writes, “Originalism was born of a 
desire to constrain judges. Judicial constraint was its heart and 
soul—its raison d’être.”35 
These claims have proven to be largely specious and illusory. 
Regardless of the originalist object, there are serious problems with 
determining the original meaning due to the lack of reliable 
evidence on particularized issues.36 Additionally, the theory that 
there is a right answer about what a provision means, especially  
in contexts regarding constitutional provisions that will be the 
source of modern litigation, is at best a legal fiction and most  
likely indeterminate.37 
Moreover, there is the albatross of a problem regarding 
accessibility. The kind of historical methodology often extolled to 
determine framers’ intent, ratifiers’ intent, and original public 
meaning is advanced and requires expertise not available to the 
public. Just consider Randy Barnett’s explanation of the 
methodology with respect to original public meaning: 
“[E]stablishing the semantic meaning of the words in the text, given 
the publicly available context, requires a survey of relevant usage. 
The search for original public meaning should be as systematic and 
comprehensive as possible with respect to any source one surveys, 
reporting deviant as well as predominate usage.”38 And for 
framers’ and ratifiers’ intents, the methodology will also include 
 
 35. Colby, New Originalism, supra note 2, at 714. 
 36. Kesavan & Paulsen, The Interpretive Force, supra note 12, at 1134–39; Colby & Smith, 
Living Originalism, supra note 2, at 248–52; Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide 
for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO STATE L.J. 1085, 1087–90 (1989). 
 37. Berger, supra note 2, at 347; Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO 
STATE L.J. 609, 617 (2008) (“The new originalism seeks the original public meaning of 
constitutional terms, but there is (was) no single such meaning, again at least for interesting 
constitutional terms.”); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE 
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 10–11 (1996) (explaining that originalism cannot often 
establish a fixed meaning); Thomas B. Colby, The Federal Marriage Amendment and the False 
Promise of Originalism, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 529, 586–99 (2008) (“In the cases in which the fear 
of judicial discretion is most acute, judges cannot render their decisions on the basis of the 
original public meaning of the Constitution for the simple reason that there never was such 
a meaning.”); Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court’s Quest 
for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217, 282–86 (2004) (“The fact that the historical record 
is susceptible to . . . conflicting interpretations means that there is significant room for judges 
to slant the historical record to serve instrumentalist goals.”). 
 38. Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 
416 (2013). 
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comprehensive research of historical manuscripts and documents, 
often inaccessible to the public.39 
On the other side of the ledger, normative originalism seems to 
carry heavy costs in that it fails to preserve core features of our law 
and legal practice and decisions that have become fixed points  
in our constitutional framework. As a matter of particular 
decisions, consider those relating to school desegregation, such as 
Brown v. Board of Education,40 Bolling v. Sharpe,41 and further 
progeny. These cases, by their own terms, did not appeal to original 
meaning in grounding their conclusions. As the chief example, 
consider Brown. There the Court considered whether de jure 
segregation of students in public schools violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.42 The case arose 
out of Topeka, Kansas, where per the local law, school districts had 
maintained separate school facilities for black and white students.43 
 
 39. This has led some originalists, chiefly Larry Solum, to posit the famous distinction 
between interpretation and construction. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism Versus Living 
Constitutionalism: The Conceptual Structure of the Great Debate, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1243, 1278 
(2019) (“Constitutional Interpretation is . . . to be the activity that discerns the meaning 
(understood as communicative content conveyed by linguistic meaning in context) of the 
constitutional text. Constitutional Construction is . . . to be the activity that determines the 
legal effect (including the decision of constitutional cases and the specification of 
constitutional doctrines) given to the constitutional text.”). The principal idea is that in some 
cases, the task of interpretation will discern the original meaning of the Constitution that will 
fully determine the legal effect in that case, and the construction process simply applies the 
result of interpretation. Id. But in other cases, the interpretation will not determine the legal 
effect—they are underdeterminate. In these cases, originalists must engage in more laborious 
construction—that will not appeal to original meaning. See id. However, what goes into 
construction—which is not defined by original meaning—is up for grabs. The originalist 
cannot cabin judicial discretion in the activity of construction any more than nonoriginalists 
and attempts at doing so look rather similar to many nonoriginalist, pluralist theories of 
interpretation. See, e.g., Amy Barrett, Introduction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 3 (2010) (“The 
existence of this ‘construction zone’ has prompted some self-proclaimed ‘living 
constitutionalists’ to defect to originalism on the rationale that the two theories are not, in 
fact, polar opposites.”); Richard S. Kay, Construction, Originalist Interpretation and the Complete 
Constitution, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. ONLINE 1, 13 (2017) (“In the context of constitutional 
adjudication, the endorsement of constitutional construction amounts to the ‘view that 
courts are authorized to impose constitutional rules other than those adopted by the 
constitutional [enactors],’ a position that more or less defines nonoriginalism.”)  
(quoting Keith Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 
408 (2013)). 
 40. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 41. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 42. Brown, 347 U.S. at 486–88. 
 43. Id. at 486 n.1. 
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A class action was filed on behalf of Black students and their 
parents, challenging the segregated schooling.44 The district court 
held that, under Plessy, the schools were substantially equal and 
therefore that the regime was constitutional.45 The Court held that 
segregation in public schools on the basis of race deprived Black 
children of equal educational opportunities and thus violated the 
Equal Protection Clause.46 In so doing, the Court effectively 
overruled its prior decision in Plessy that “separate but equal” 
facilities were constitutionally permissible,47 stating that “separate 
educational facilities are inherently unequal.”48 In the opinion, the 
Court specifically observed, “In approaching this problem, we 
cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was 
adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We 
must consider public education in the light of its full development 
and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.”49 
This last point is critical. The decision in Brown is generally 
understood to be a repudiation of originalist thinking. It eschews 
the idea that the proper focus is on the original meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, in 1868, and that the Court must consider 
the evolving circumstances to properly evaluate the law. As a 
historical matter, the authors of the Amendment, the ratifiers of the 
Amendment, or the public at large would not have interpreted the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause to prohibit 
racial segregation in schools. But the Court set aside those facts to 
rule otherwise. 
Then consider another school desegregation case Bolling v. 
Sharpe. There, the government action segregating public schooling 
was not state action, but federal-government action in the District 
of Columbia.50 However, Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
declares “[n]o State shall . . . .”51 Thus, because the Fourteenth 
Amendment limits the action of the state government and not the 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. See id. The case before the Supreme Court was consolidated with similar challenges 
in 5 other states. Id. 
 46. Id. at 493. 
 47. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 48. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
 49. Id. at 492–93. 
 50. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 497 (1954). 
 51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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federal government, the Bolling Court, unlike in Brown, could not 
rely on the Fourteenth Amendment to find school segregation in 
D.C. unconstitutional. Instead, the Court relied on the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to hold the federal action 
unconstitutional.52 The originalist problem in Brown is further 
exacerbated, because beyond the historical fact that the framers, 
ratifiers, and founding-era public would not have found racial 
segregation unconstitutional, it does not seem plausible that the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause reaches racial segregation 
in public schools.53 Moreover, there is a striking lack of textual and 
historical analysis in the opinion, suggesting that the opinion is 
thoroughly nonoriginalist in character.54  
Consider also the decisions upholding laws prohibiting  
private discrimination under the Commerce Clause, such as Heart 
of Atlanta Motel and Katzenbach.55 Those too are of questionable 
 
 52. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Bolling, 347 U.S. at 497, 498. 
 53. Peter J. Rubin, Taking Its Proper Place in the Constitutional Canon: Bolling v. Sharpe, 
Korematsu, and the Equal Protection Component of Fifth Amendment Due Process, 92 VA. L. REV. 
1879, 1880 (2006) (“[I]t is widely accepted, by those who defend the decision as well as those 
who attack it, that [Bolling’s] doctrinal innovation cannot be easily justified by the Fifth 
Amendment’s text or its history . . . .”); Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due 
Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 428–59 (2010) (examining evidence indicating that the public 
understanding of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in 1791 likely did not 
encompass substantive rights). 
 54. Ryan C. Williams, Originalism and the Other Desegregation Decision, 99 VA. L. REV. 
493, 496 (2013) (“The Bolling Court made no effort to ground its holding in the original 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment and only a cursory effort to reconcile its decision with 
either the text of the Due Process Clause or the Court’s own earlier interpretations of that 
provision.”). But see Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions,  
81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995) (proffering an originalist argument for Brown). 
 55. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding 
Congress’ power to prohibit private race discrimination in places of public accommodation, 
like hotels, under the Commerce Clause powers); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,  
299–301 (1964) (upholding Congress’ power to prohibit private race discrimination in places 
of public accommodation, like restaurants, under the Commerce Clause powers). 
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originalist vintage.56 And so are the decisions extending Equal 
Protection doctrines in discrimination based on sex and gender.57  
All of these cases—Brown, Bolling, Heart of Atlanta Motel, and 
Katzenbach—are so important and foundational to our 
jurisprudence to be canonical, such that some scholars have called 
them “fixed points.”58 A theory of constitutional interpretation that 
fails to preserve the fixed points is one that is disruptive and, 
indeed, fails to be a theory of our law. In Lawrence Solum’s words, 
“Given these starting points, originalism must be rejected if it is 
inconsistent with Brown or if it would endorse Plessy.”59 
Apart from particular decisions, as a more systemic matter 
consider stare decisis.60 It is the doctrine that a court should decide 
future cases in accord with the court’s decisions in prior cases.61 A 
fundamental tenet of the common law is that like cases should be 
treated alike, and stare decisis is a tool to ensure that goal.62 The 
doctrine is not necessarily absolute; that a legal system includes 
stare decisis does not mean that courts cannot reverse course and 
overturn prior decisions. It only means that prior decisions have 
weight and that in some cases that weight is sufficient to dictate a 
particular result in accord with the prior decisions. But, in at least 
some cases, stare decisis will require that the weight of a prior 
decision is sufficient reason for a court to rule in accord with the 
prior decision, despite the fact that the court disagrees with the 
prior decision and believes it to be incorrectly decided. 
 
 56. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Debate on Radicals in Robes, in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-
CENTURY OF DEBATE 287 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007); R. George Wright, The Limits of the 
Interstate Commerce Power: How to Decide the Close Cases, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. Postscript 45, 55 
(2019) (discussing the Court’s acknowledgement that, in cases such as Heart of Atlanta Motel 
or Katzenbach, Commerce Clause power is not primarily concerned with “commerce” as it 
might be understood by an originalist, but “instead seized upon opportunistically by 
Congress as an expedient means of promoting some element of morality, equality, justice, or 
personal dignity”). 
 57. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Adam Cohen, Justice Scalia 
Mouths Off on Sex Discrimination, TIME (Sept. 22, 2010), http:// www.time.com/time/ 
nation/article/0,8599,2020667,00.html (“Nobody thought [the Fourteenth Amendment] was 
directed against sex discrimination.”). 
 58. Lawrence B. Solum, Surprising Originalism: The Regula Lecture, 9 CONLAWNOW 
235, 259 (2018). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 61. Id. 
 62. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 86 (1982) (“[T]he 
fundamental role of common law courts is to keep like cases being treated alike . . . .”). 
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Thus, stare decisis poses a conundrum for originalists.63 
Original meaning provides the content of the law. But suppose, in 
some case, there is an intervening nonoriginalist precedent that 
conflicts with the original meaning and would dictate a result that 
contravenes how the original meaning would decide the case. Then 
the originalist must make a decision: should the original meaning 
decide the case or should the nonoriginalist precedent? Stare decisis 
is such an important feature of our legal system that dispensing 
with it would be a serious departure from our law. Moreover, as 
shown by the particular cases, there are nonoriginalist judicial 
decisions that have become an important part of our law, such that 
there are notice, stability, and predictability interests intricately 
tethered to those decisions. It would cause enormous disruption  
in our constitutional practice if they were overturned.64  
This would “entail[] a massive repudiation of the present  
constitutional order.”65 
Originalists are not without their responses to the problem of 
preservation, but questions then arise whether the resultant 
originalism has impact on the consequential benefits of normative 
originalism, like in utility and feasibility, coherence, or notice, 
predictability, stability, and cabining judicial discretion.66 
 
 63. Amy Coney Barrett, Originalism and Stare Decisis, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1921, 
1922 (2017) (recognizing the “tension between stare decisis and originalism”); Henry Paul 
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 727 (1988) 
(“[I]nsistence upon original intent as the only legitimate standard for judicial 
decisionmaking entails a massive repudiation of the present constitutional order.”);  
Randy J. Kozel, The Scope of Precedent, 113 MICH. L. REV. 179, 213–14 (2014) (“[Originalism’s] 
focus on fixed meanings can seem to put originalism at odds with deference to judicial 
precedents that deviate from the enacted Constitution.”); Barnett, supra note 32, at 258–62 
(arguing that theory of originalism must reject nonoriginalist precedent); Nelson Lund, Stare 
Decisis and Originalism: Judicial Disengagement from the Supreme Court’s Errors, 19 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 1029, 1030 (2012) (“The doctrine and practice of stare decisis create a real tension with 
the principle of originalism, precisely because the Supreme Court undoubtedly has made, 
and will inevitably continue to make, serious interpretive errors.”). 
 64. Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW at 133, 139–40 (1997) (recognizing that giving up stare decisis would be “disruptive 
of the established state of things”). Indeed, if Roe, Casey, Brown, Bolling, Heart of Atlanta, and 
Katzenbach, to name only a few, were of questionable constitutional validity, that would be a 
sea change in our practice of law. 
 65. Monaghan, supra note 63, at 727 (referring to original-intent originalism). 
 66. Roughly, I see three kinds of responses for normative originalists with regard to 
the objection that originalism fails to preserve our law: 
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II. POSITIVIST ORIGINALISM AND ORIGINAL-LAW ORIGINALISM 
Enter into the scene—courtesy of William Baude and  
Stephen E. Sachs—a supposedly new conceptualization of 
originalism.67 The animating idea of this project is to understand 
that originalism, properly conceptualized, is not just a theory of 
interpretation, but a theory of law.68 Baude and Sachs contend, as a 
theory of law—that is, a theory of what our law is—it must attend 
to how law is practiced. This requires a focus on “positive law”—
what the law is and not what it ought to be.69 This is what gives rise 
to the name “positivist originalism.” 
 
First, they can bite the bullet and recognize that normative originalism would entail 
these results, but those bad results can be cured by amendment. Justice Clarence Thomas 
seems to take this view. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 812–13 (2010) 
(Thomas, J., concurring); Marah Stith McLeod, A Humble Justice, 127 YALE L.J.F. 196, 205 
(2017) (“Justice Thomas has rejected the doctrine of constitutional stare decisis . . . .”).  
This has the problem that many would not accept a theory of law that denies fixed stars. 
Second, they can recognize the infelicity in the theory that it must make room for 
nonoriginalist fixed-point decisions and accommodate nonoriginalist doctrines like stare 
decisis but argue that this is not a significant problem for originalism as a theory.  
Justice Antonin Scalia seemed to take this view. Scalia, supra note 64, at 139–40 (arguing that 
stare decisis poses a problem for every theory of interpretation and thus does not pose any 
specific problem for originalism vis-à-vis any other theory of interpretation). This has the 
problem that it seems incoherent and unprincipled. 
Third, they can argue that normative originalism actually does preserve these 
particular decisions and procedures. Many scholars have taken up this charge with respect 
to a number of surprising decisions. E.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution 
Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 900–07 (2009) (arguing that 
Brown and the Legal Tender Cases are in accord with originalism). See generally  
McConnell, supra note 54 (proffering an originalist argument for Brown); Steven G. Calabresi 
& Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2011) (proffering an 
originalist argument for sex discrimination laws and regulations being constitutional). And 
others have argued that the doctrine of stare decisis itself is originalist. Polly J. Price,  
A Constitutional Significance for Precedent: Originalism, Stare Decisis, and Property Rights, 5 AVE 
MARIA L. REV. 113, 114 (2007) (arguing that originalism incorporates stare decisis because the 
original meaning of the “‘judicial power’ in Article III encompassed significant respect for 
prior precedent as a starting point for judicial decision making”); Nelson Lund, The Second 
Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1347 (2009) (arguing 
that “there is strong evidence that the Vesting Clause of Article III implicitly incorporated a 
principle of stare decisis”). The problem here is that these arguments usually proceed by 
abstracting the Constitution to a high level of generality, which results in more variability in 
how the Constitution is interpreted and greater room for judicial discretion. 
 67. See supra notes 7–8. 
 68. Sachs, Legal Change, supra note 7, at 818. 
 69. Id.; Baude & Sachs, Grounding Originalism, supra note 7, at 1457. 
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Foundational in attending to our legal practice is 
understanding that the law is what it is until it is changed.70 In 
Baude and Sachs’s words, 
Officially, we treat the Constitution as a piece of enacted law that 
was adopted a long time ago; whatever law it made back then 
remains the law, subject to various de jure alterations or 
amendments made since. And we identify modern law by way of 
this past law, the way a nemo dat rule identifies today’s property 
holdings by way of yesterday’s transfers: explaining how a legal 
rule enjoys good title today means explaining how it lawfully 
arose out of the government established at the Founding.71 
This has led Stephen Sachs to call originalism “a theory of legal 
change.”72 And this too explains why we should focus on the 
“original law.” If the law is what it was until it was lawfully 
changed, then we should start with what the law was at the 
beginning—namely, original-law originalism. 
Original-law originalism “is broad and inclusive, in that it 
serves as a criterion for the rest of our constitutional law, ‘including 
of the validity of other methods of interpretation or decision.’”73 It 
is not always followed, just as laws are broken by the citizenry, but 
it reflects “the ‘deep structure’ of our constitutional law, present in 
our frequent practices of identifying, justifying, and debating the 
content of our law.”74 Moreover, they say this theory of 
interpretation, original-law originalism, is “exacting in 
application” and provides empirical conditions of validity and 
falsifiability.75 It does not merely reflect policy preferences, but 
rather it requires and marshals specific historical evidence to 
resolve legal questions.76 
A. The Content of Original-Law Originalism 
Sachs describes original-law originalism with a succinct, 
recursive definition: 
 
 70. Baude & Sachs, Grounding Originalism, supra note 7, at 1457. 
 71. Id.  
 72. See generally Sachs, Legal Change, supra note 7. 
 73. Baude & Sachs, Grounding Originalism, supra note 7, at 1457 (citing Baude,  
Is Originalism Our Law?, supra note 7, at 2352). 
 74. Baude & Sachs, Grounding Originalism, supra note 7, at 1458. 
 75. Id. (citing Baude & Sachs, Originalism’s Bite, supra note 7, at 104). 
 76. Id.  
2.KRISHNAMURTHI_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  3/11/2021  12:56 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:2 (2021) 
422 
 
(1) All rules that were valid as of the founding remain valid over 
time, except as lawfully changed. 
(2) A change was lawful if and only if it was made under a rule of 
change that was valid at the time under (1). 
(3) No rules are valid except by operation of (1) and (2).77 
From their accounts, this definition seems to characterize  
both of their individual and joint understandings of  
original-law originalism.78 However, what all goes into (1) and 
(2) is unclear. Seemingly, (1) is designed to capture the original 
primary rules, while (2) is intended to capture the rules as they have 
been lawfully changed.79 More specifically, the law includes the 
following buckets: 
First, there are the particular rules in the Constitution at the 
founding with their particular original meaning.80 Importantly, 
some of these rules do allow for changes, and potentially 
surprising, outcomes with different factual input. This means that, 
with our world evolving and changing, the founding-era rules of 
the Constitution may apply to produce evolved and changed 
outcomes.81 Standard examples of these evolving and changed 
meanings of the rules include the application of “unreasonable” in 
the Fourth Amendment, “cruel and unusual” in the Eighth 
Amendment, and “property” in the Fifth Amendment.82 These 
evolved and changed meanings may be conceived of as part of and 
 
 77. Sachs, Legal Change, supra note 7, at 845. Sachs acknowledges that original-law 
originalism is a variant of “original-methods originalism,” prominently articulated by  
John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport. See generally JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. 
RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION (2013); John O. McGinnis &  
Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the 
Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751 (2009) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport, 
Original Methods Originalism]. Sachs clarifies that original-law originalism resolves a 
particular question of original-methods originalism about which methods to use by appeal 
to positivist theory about which methods were in fact the law. Sachs, Legal Change, supra note 
7, at 883. But importantly, McGinnis and Rappaport’s project is a positive and normative 
one—they make the claim that the theory is the better theory along many normative 
dimensions. McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism, supra, at 752–53. That 
stands in contrast with the main thrust of Baude and Sachs’s project. 
 78. Sachs, Legal Change, supra note 7, at 845; Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, supra  
note 7, at 2355 & n.16. 
 79. Sachs, Legal Change, supra note 7, at 845. 
 80. Id. at 845–52. 
 81. Id. at 852–55. 
 82. Id. at 855; Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, supra note 7, at 2356–57. 
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interacting with (1) or (2), but regardless they are part of the 
original-law originalism. Along with this is the explicit rule of 
change in Article V that sets forth the specific conditions for 
amending the Constitution.83 
Next, original-law originalism includes doctrines to resolve 
ambiguity and vagueness. Examples of these include construction, 
liquidation, and presumptions.84 Similarly, original-law 
originalism includes domesticating doctrines, like adverse 
possession, statutes of limitation and laches, waiver, mistake, de 
facto constructions, and the like.85 Whether and to what extent these 
doctrines were part of the founding-era law is an open question, 
but the answer to that is resolved by historical reference.86 These 
primarily are part of the methods of lawful change under (2).87 
Finally, there is stare decisis and the doctrine of precedent.  
As Baude observes, there are various justifications for why  
stare decisis is concordant with originalism.88 But what is clear is 
that it was part of the founding-era law, and thus it is part of 
original-law originalism.89 This too is primarily a method of lawful 
change under (2).90 
B. Evidence of Original-Law Originalism 
Now, what is the evidence that original-law originalism is  
our law? Baude and Sachs appeal to higher-order practices and  
lower-order practices that they contend show together that our law 
conforms to original-law originalism. For higher-order practices, 
they reference the attribution of authority to the framers, the lack 
of any acknowledged rupture in the legal order, and the continued 
usage of the institutions created by the original Constitution.91 
With respect to lower-order practices, Baude and Sachs appeal 
to the fact that in particular Supreme Court decisions, originalism 
 
 83. Sachs, Legal Change, supra note 7, at 855. 
 84. Id. at 856; Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, supra note 7, at 2357–58. 
 85. Sachs, Legal Change, supra note 7, at 859–60. 
 86. Id. at 879–80; Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, supra note 7, at 2358. 
 87. Sachs, Legal Change, supra note 7, at 852–64. 
 88. Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, supra note 7, at 2358–59. 
 89. Id.; Sachs, Legal Change, supra note 7, at 852. 
 90. Sachs, Legal Change, supra note 7, at 852. 
 91. Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, supra note 7, at 2366–71; Sachs, Legal Change,  
supra note 7, at 844–45. 
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takes decision-making priority and there is an absence of  
anti-originalist cases.92 With respect to this latter claim, Baude 
argues that many of the supposedly nonoriginalist decisions—
Brown, Miranda, Lawrence, Roe, Reed, and Gideon—are  
arguably originalist.93 
Baude and Sachs also argue that the claim that original-law 
originalism is our law does not necessarily contend that it has been 
our law continuously.94 Indeed, they recognize that there may have 
been “constitution interregnums” during which originalism did 
not govern.95 
C. The Connection with Legal Positivism 
Baude and Sachs see original-law originalism as a legal 
positivist theory inspired by H.L.A. Hart. Legal positivism is a 
theory of what constitutes and determines law. “The most 
fundamental of positivism’s core commitments is the Social Facts 
Thesis, which asserts that law is, in essence, a social creation or 
artefact.”96 Alongside this foundational assumption is the famous 
positivist mantra that law has “no necessary connection” to 
morality—known as the separability thesis.97 As Les Green has 
observed, it cannot be taken literally, as there are many obvious 
“necessary connections” between morality and law.98 Thus, the 
exact contours of this thesis are uncertain. At the least, it seems to 
mean that it is not necessary that morality be a criterion of legal 
 
 92. Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, supra note 7, at 2372–86; Sachs, Legal Change,  
supra note 7, at 837–38 (citing Baude’s manuscript approvingly for this proposition). 
 93. Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, supra note 7, at 2377–86. Sachs suggests an 
originalist reading of Brown. Sachs, Legal Change, supra note 7, at 854. Baude also included 
Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444 (1934), in this list, but later along 
with Sachs contended that Blaisdell was wrongly decided under original-law originalist 
jurisprudence. Baude & Sachs, Originalism’s Bite, supra note 7, at 108. 
 94. Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, supra note 7, at 2389; Sachs, Legal Change,  
supra note 7, at 848–49. 
 95. Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, supra note 7, at 2389; see also Sachs, Legal Change, 
supra note 7, at 848–49. 
 96. Kenneth Einar Himma, Inclusive Legal Positivism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 126 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002). 
 97. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 
601 n.25 (1957). 
 98. Leslie Green, Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Morals, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1035, 1041–45 (2008). 
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validity,99 and the fact that something is law does not necessarily 
carry moral weight.100 
Hart’s own version of legal positivism proffered the following 
structure: a legal system is the union of primary and secondary 
rules. Primary rules are those rules that regulate behavior; they are 
the rules that are “concerned with the actions that individuals must 
or must not do.”101 For example, the laws criminalizing murder, 
rape, and theft are primary rules. Secondary rules are rules about 
the primary rules. For Hart, these secondary rules are in three 
types: the rule of recognition, the rules of change, and the rules of 
adjudication. Importantly, the secondary rules are fixed by 
convergent practice, with the appropriate attitude of acceptance, 
among the officials of the legal system that constitutes a social 
rule—known as the conventionality thesis.102 
Hart contends then that, for there to be a legal system, regular 
citizens must generally obey the primary rules, and the officials of 
the system must, from an internal point of view, accept the 
secondary rules.103 Among the secondary rules, the rule of 
recognition is foremost in importance: it is the rule by which an 
official in the legal system recognizes putative laws as actual laws. 
The rule of recognition does this through criteria of validity, that 
are inferred from social practice and provide “conclusive 
affirmative indication that it is a rule of the group.”104 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Hart, supra note 97, at 619. 
 101. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 92 (2d ed. 1994) (with a Postscript edited by 
Penelope A. Bulloch and Joseph Raz). 
 102. Guha Krishnamurthi, Don’t Go Breaking My Hart, Note, 88 TEX. L. REV. 833, 837 
(2010); Jules Coleman, Incorporationism, Conventionality and the Practical Difference Thesis, in 
HART’S POSTSCRIPT 99, 101 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001). Importantly, this is not to say that all 
convergent behavior of officials generates legal rules. 
 103. HART, supra note 101, at 116. What is precisely meant by the internal point of view 
has been the source of much scholarly consideration. I follow Shapiro in thinking “[t]he 
internal point of view is the practical attitude of rule acceptance—it does not imply that 
people who accept the rules accept their moral legitimacy, only that they are disposed to 
guide and evaluate conduct in accordance with the rules.” Scott J. Shapiro, What Is the Internal 
Point of View?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1157, 1157 (2006). 
 104. HART, supra note 101, at 92, 107. Here, I set out the contours of legal positivism in 
terms of Hartian legal positivism. That choice may be a source of controversy, because there 
are other types of legal positivism, including from Hans Kelsen and Joseph Raz. I will use 
Hart’s theory as a prototype, due to its status among positivist theories, but I think that my 
arguments proceed assuming any minimally positivist theory. For more on how Baude and 
Sachs’s view disagrees with other positivist theories, see generally Barzun, supra note 9. 
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So, in what way, then, is original-law originalism a positivist 
theory? There are a couple of mainstays. First, Baude and Sachs 
both focus on actual practice in fashioning their theory of law. Their 
idea seems to be, inspired by Hart, that a theory of what the law is 
must attend to social facts, and specifically how we actually 
practice law. Second, Baude and Sachs suggest, through this 
picture, a type of rule of recognition for determining whether some 
putative law is valid: first, ask whether it was a law that was valid 
at the time of the founding and, if not, then ask whether it can be 
traced through lawful changes to a law that was valid at the time of 
the founding. 
D. The Justification for and Normativity of Original-Law Originalism 
What is the nature of this justification for original-law 
originalism and why should we be originalists? At the core of the 
argument is the prima facie obligation of officials—primarily judges 
but also other constitutional actors—to apply the law.105  
Per Charles Barzun’s insightful schematization,106 the argument 
proceeds as follows then: 
Premise 1: The law is whatever is supported by the right kind of 
social facts. 
Premise 2: Original-law Originalism is supported by the right 
kind of social facts. 
Conclusion 1: Therefore, Original-law Originalism is the law.107 
Premise 3: Officials have a prima facie duty to apply the law. 
Conclusion 2: Therefore, officials have a prima facie duty to 
apply Original-law Originalism.108 
 
 105. Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, supra note 7, at 2392–93. 
 106. Barzun, supra note 9, at 1339. 
 107. These first three premises come from Sachs’s account. Sachs, Legal Change, supra 
note 7, at 835. Sachs’s formulation of Premise 1 is “Whatever is supported by the right kind 
of social facts is part of our law,” but later he clarifies that the position is stronger. Id. at 864. 
 108. Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, supra note 7, at 2392–97 (explicitly defending 
Premise 3); Sachs, Legal Change, supra note 7, at 835. It could also be that the duty to apply the 
law is pro tanto, rather than merely prima facie: 
A pro tanto reason has genuine weight, but nonetheless may be outweighed by 
other considerations. Thus, calling a reason a pro tanto reason is to be distinguished 
from calling it a prima facie reason, [because] . . . a prima facie reason appears to be 
a reason, but may actually not be a reason at all.  
SHELLY KAGAN, THE LIMITS OF MORALITY 17 (1989). 
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Premise 1 is just a core commitment of legal positivism, namely 
the social facts thesis.109 Thus, legal positivists will find little to 
complain about there. And Conclusion 1 is validly deduced from 
Premise 1 and Premise 2. 
Premise 2 is the most obvious target of criticism. If it is not the 
case that original-law originalism is supported by the right kind of 
social facts, then original-law originalism is not our law and Baude 
and Sachs will have failed in their project. At first glance, Premise 3 
also seems to be generally uncontroversial. But on further 
inspection, the reference to duty is highly indeterminate with 
respect to fixing a particular law and would seem to require appeal 
to theoretical questions to get any tangible results—the same 
theoretical questions that Baude and Sachs contend we can 
circumvent by appeal to positivist originalism. 
With respect to this schematization of the argument, I will focus 
my efforts primarily on Premise 2 and Conclusion 2. I first argue that 
Baude and Sachs’s methodology is flawed in that they ignore 
important social facts, which implicate theoretical questions. Next, 
I contend that Premise 2 is either false or an uninteresting thesis that 
will not ground a meaningful theory of interpretation. Finally, I 
argue that Conclusion 2 is not robust enough to sustain a meaningful 
originalist theory of interpretation. 
E. The Tangible Results 
Finally, Baude and Sachs do offer some tangible results of  
this original-law originalism—what they call original-law 
originalism’s “bite”: 
[T]he time has come to start naming names. Without having done 
the research ourselves, we doubt (say) that the original 
Constitution let states impair contracts on claims of “economic 
emergency”—or that this power was ever lawfully conferred 
since. We likewise doubt the pedigree of modern cases on 
executive agreements; jury numbers or unanimity; counsel 
comment on failure to testify; one-person one-vote; diversity 
jurisdiction for D.C. citizens; “commerce” regulation of wholly 
intrastate activity; administrative adjudication of private rights; 
and maybe even commandeering state officers or Article III limits 
on standing. Maybe the cases are right despite our doubts, or at 
 
 109. Sachs, Legal Change, supra note 7, at 835. 
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least tolerable under original doctrines of stare decisis. (Again, we 
haven’t done the research.) And maybe more, or more 
controversial, cases belong on that list. But the fact that [original-
law] originalism brings these cases into doubt, or even disrepute, 
shows that the theory has real bite.110 
Of course, the theory also preserves key features of our practice 
of law, by incorporating them explicitly. Under this original-law 
originalism, there is no longer the criticism that the theory does not 
accommodate stare decisis because it explicitly incorporates that. 
This is similarly the case for a number of the other discussed 
doctrines, including clarity resolving and domesticating doctrines. 
What’s more, the incorporation of these doctrines is not 
unprincipled. It looks to the founding-era law, as the original law, 
and embraces stare decisis and these doctrines on the basis of them 
being part of the original law. 
Importantly, nonoriginalist decisions are problematic for this 
theory. That is because nonoriginalist decisions, especially a 
substantial number of them, show that our law is not in fact 
originalist. A few particular nonoriginalist results may not be 
enough to falsify the theory. The question, as a positivist theory, is 
whether there are enough nonoriginalist decisions to show that 
there is not a consensus of legal officials who understand original-
law originalism to be our law. 
Relatedly, one question is what impact on the theory there is 
from canonical nonoriginalist decisions that may have obtained the 
same result under original-law originalism reasoning. As above, 
such decisions, especially a substantial number of them, would 
tend to show that original-law originalism is not our law. But the 
fact that their results can be duplicated with original-law originalist 
 
 110. Baude & Sachs, Originalism’s Bite, supra note 7, at 108. Baude and Sachs cite the 
following cases as potentially wrongly decided under original-law originalism: Home 
Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444 (1934); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 
U.S. 654 (1981); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 
(1970); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 53 (1964); National 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 
(1942); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
For a convincing response to Originalism’s Bite, see Richard A. Posner & Eric J. Segall, 
Faux Originalism, 20 GREEN BAG 2D 109 (2016). “[T]he entire, long history of constitutional 
adjudication by the Supreme Court demonstrates that originalism does not supply ‘resources 
for deciding cases and resolving ambiguities.’” Id. at 112. 
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thinking blunts any preservation objections that might arise. For 
example, suppose that Brown is a nonoriginalist decision, but that 
there is an originalist reconstruction of the result in Brown. That 
would parry the criticism that originalism would fail to preserve 
our law because it would preserve Brown as a canonical “fixed 
point” of our law. 
Notice though that stare decisis does not obviously help in this 
regard of preserving the law. The doctrine of stare decisis is of 
course helpful in ensuring that adopting original-law originalism 
will not require that we give up any canonical fixed points of the 
law. But stare decisis will not help in ensuring that those decisions 
became part of our law in the first place. When the Warren Court 
was deciding Brown, they could not rely on stare decisis to come to 
the conclusion of Brown. It was a novel decision. What is needed for 
original-law originalism to fully preserve our law is that there are 
justifications of fixed-point canonical nonoriginalist decisions that 
show that the decisions were legally correct when made and that 
are rooted in originalism. 
III. POSITIVIST ORIGINALISM IS NOT LEGAL POSITIVIST  
My first contention is that positivist originalism, as a matter of 
its methodology, contradicts core features of legal positivism. 
Specifically, it has a narrow focus on case results, judicial opinion 
language, and superficial judicial behavior, ignoring other 
important facts like judges’ theoretical and political commitments 
that explain their actions. This results in a myopic view that fails to 
truly appreciate the legal positivist social facts thesis. 
The project of positivist originalism and original-law 
originalism focuses on the core thesis of positivism that the law is a 
product of social facts. As discussed, Baude and Sachs contend that 
we should be attending to how law is practiced. The idea is that if 
we focus on our legal practice—that is, the right kinds of social 
facts—then, heeding the positivist thesis, we will obtain what the 
law is. This, they contend, should be our focus rather than on other 
theoretical questions, such as normative, interpretive, and 
linguistic questions.111 
 
 111. Baude & Sachs, Grounding Originalism, supra note 7, at 1458 (“As a theoretical 
matter, if the interpreter’s job is to ask what our law is (and to leave to others what it  
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This last point is critical: the positive turn’s primary value is in 
avoiding theoretical debates and supplanting them with positive 
questions—that are objectively answerable with reference to 
historical, empirical questions. If, in the course of the positive 
analysis, we have to answer theoretical questions, then the positive 
turn has failed in its mission. That is because we were already 
mired in difficult theoretical questions—and the positive turn was 
supposed to allow us to bypass those with objectively answerable 
questions about our legal practice. 
Now a critical initial question for the positivist originalist is 
what it means to focus on how law is practiced. Baude and Sachs 
seem to focus on the results of cases, the language in judicial 
opinions, and the ostensible behavior of litigating lawyers—usually 
in light of judicial behavior—as instructive of our actual legal 
practices.112 Thus, the promise of positivist originalism and 
original-law originalism is that by focusing on these social facts, we 
can avoid the aforementioned theoretical jurisprudential questions. 
We should be skeptical. To understand why, it helps to begin 
with an understanding of legal positivism’s focus on social facts in 
determining the law. As discussed above, the key observation of 
legal positivism, especially of the Hartian variety, is that law is a 
product of the convergent practices of a consensus of the legal 
officials in the system, with the appropriate attitude.113 And we use 
 
should be), then many of our interpretive and normative disputes are reframed.”);  
Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, supra note 7, at 2352 (“If originalism is the law, then neither 
the conceptual nor normative justifications need to bear as much weight. Originalists need 
not prove that originalism is inherent in ‘the nature’ of constitutions or interpretation, just 
that it is a convention of our interpretation of our Constitution.”); Barzun, supra note 9, at 
1325 (“The core idea of the positive turn is that debates about how to properly interpret 
statutes and the Constitution ought to be settled neither by analyzing concepts of meaning, 
interpretation, or authority nor by engaging in normative debates sounding in political or 
moral philosophy.”). 
 112. See supra Section II.B. 
 113. Other scholars have questioned Baude and Sachs’s contention that they can avoid 
determining the answers to the jurisprudential debates about the nature of our law, such as 
between Hartian positivism, other varieties of positivism, and the Dworkinian model. See 
generally Greenberg, supra note 9; Barzun, supra note 9. In particular, Greenberg and Barzun 
both observe that the choice of Hartian positivism might be a bad one for Baude and Sachs, 
because according to the Hartian model, there is no law on controversial questions because 
the controversy undercuts the consensus needed for law. Baude and Sachs contend that this 
misunderstands Hart, because there may be consensus on theoretical questions that leads to 
surprising and perhaps controversial results about what the law is. 
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social facts to determine what that consensus is using inference, 
taking into account the norms of (legal) reasoning.  
Consider Hart’s famous example of “No Vehicles in the 
Park.”114 It goes like this: “A legal rule forbids you to take a vehicle 
into the public park. Plainly this forbids an automobile, but what 
about bicycles, roller skates, toy automobiles? What about 
airplanes? Are these, as we say, to be called ‘vehicles’ for the 
purpose of the rule or not?”115 There are easy cases and difficult 
ones. But, even in the simplest case, in the Hartian framework, a 
person considering and applying the law utilizes inference and the 
norms of reasoning. 
For example, consider a park-goer who thinks about whether 
they may drive their Fiat 300 into the park. They see the sign with 
the prohibition, “No Vehicles in the Park.” They might think, “Well, 
my Fiat 300 is a ‘vehicle’ and so it is not allowed in the Park, ergo I 
should not drive it into the Park.” This involves a fairly simple rule 
of substitution, based on a particular lexicon. But it is inferential. 
As Hart says, the officials are not there to weigh in on whether the 
Fiat 300 counts as a “vehicle” and there may be no exhaustive list. 
Even this simple application of a rule requires the person applying 
the law to utilize inference and the norms of reasoning to make a 
decision about the law. 
Importantly, one could make an inference about the law, even 
if legal officials do not have a present view on the legal matter or 
have not considered it. With the example of vehicles in the park, it 
was not necessary for anyone to have considered whether a Fiat 300 
 
I think Baude and Sachs are wrong about controversy in the law on the Hartian model. 
It is true that theoretical commitments may lead to surprising results, but if a consensus of 
officials remain unconvinced and still do not accept those results, then it is still not the law. 
See Guha Krishnamurthi, A Hartian Account of Genuine Theoretical Disagreement  
(Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 20-06), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3562495. 
 114. Hart, supra note 97, at 607. Hart uses this example to explain indeterminacy in 
valid legal rules, whereas I use it to explain features of the legal positivist views of rules. 
I must acknowledge here that some may consider this example as obfuscating the 
distinction between determining how to apply valid legal rules and determining the content 
of rules and the rule of recognition. In my view, we should be skeptical of the distinction, or 
at least its sharpness. Individual applications of the law are made in light of some criteria, 
which in turn may illuminate what the rules are. But this example is just meant to be 
schematic, to illustrate how other social facts can inform the law. I thank Brian Leiter for 
calling my attention to this point. 
 115. Id. 
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(or a blue Fiat 300 or a blue Fiat 300 with a “Michigan Go Blue” 
sticker) is a vehicle for the driver to determine that it is a vehicle 
that is legally forbidden in the park. We can use our powers of 
inference, based on the norms of legal reasoning, to determine that 
these novelties of the case—like the color of the car or the college 
sticker—are superfluous to the result. Every particular case is novel 
in some way and it requires the legal thinker confronted with a 
question to determine what legal effect those novelties will have.116 
But, in so doing, we have to consider all the relevant social facts 
that may impact the officials’ behavior. Imagine a society that is 
highly stratified by caste. And suppose at the top rests a small but 
distinct set of people who belong to an ‘elite,’ who for some reason 
are subject to special treatment by officials. Specifically, the elite 
may often engage in conduct prohibited by the laws on the books 
with impunity, especially if the law-breaking conduct is not 
considered serious or grave. But otherwise, the society and the legal 
officials are vigilant about sanctioning and punishing law breaking, 
even for minor offenses. 
Then an elite’s automobile—adorned with an elite sticker—
enters and parks in the park for the first time. When the car enters 
and parks, the officials realize that the automobile is one owned by 
an elite. So, what will the officials do? It is unclear, because there 
are two strong opposing inferences we can draw—that the car will 
be prohibited because it violates the proscription or the car will be 
allowed because it is elite. What is clear is that, in trying to assess 
the law, you cannot confine yourself to the social facts about the 
enforcement of the vehicles-in-the-park regulation. You must look 
at the broader social facts about how elites are treated. And indeed, 
it could be that the law is actually: “No vehicles in the park; but if 
visibly adorned with elite symbols, then a vehicle will be allowed 
in the park.” Indeed, it might be built into the rule of recognition 
that any law about conduct that is not serious or grave has 
exemptions for the elite.117 
 
 116. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Theory and the Rule of Recognition: Toward a 
Fourth Theory of Law, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 269,  
277–80 (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009). 
 117. There also may be no consensus, in which case there is no law. And more 
generally, there may not always be an answer to a legal question about how a consensus of 
officials will act. In such cases, the law is indeterminate, on the legal positivist picture. 
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In sum, to determine what the law is, we must look to all of the 
social facts that would help us infer what the consensus of legal 
officials is. Baude and Sachs’s methodology seems to suggest that 
the social facts that matter are results in cases, judicial opinion 
language, and perhaps lawyer behavior (in light of judicial 
behavior).118 Those are important data points, but there are plainly 
other relevant social facts. 
Consider Legal Realism, which sought to show that “the act of 
judging was not impersonal or mechanistic, but rather was 
necessarily infected by the judges’ personal values.”119 The Legal 
Realists gave at least three reasons for this claim: the vagueness and 
ambiguity in the legal rules, the indeterminacy of the holdings in 
cases, and the fact that there were often contradictory rules 
applicable.120 From these insights we have seen a New Legal 
Realism, characterized by empirical studies of officials’ behavior 
that show the variety of factors—beyond the recognized legal 
sources—that may impact officials’ behavior and, consequently,  
the law.121 
Importantly, these Legal Realists are engaged in a descriptive 
practice. They are, at a first level, trying to explain what judges and 
officials actually do. That is, Legal Realists observe that, if we were 
to simply take all the recognized sources of law, we would find 
indeterminacy, incompleteness, and incoherence, so there must be 
more to the story. And then they consider other social facts to 
complete the story, to make inferences about what is the consensus 
of legal officials on certain questions. In my view, the Legal Realists 
were on to something.122 But the important point is that the  
 
 118. Sachs, Legal Change, supra note 7, at 856 (discussing NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. 
Ct. 2550 (2014)); Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, supra note 7, at 2372–74 (same); id. at  
2364–75 (discussing other cases); see also id. at 2351 n.5 (referencing “lawyers’ assumptions”); 
Sachs, Legal Change, supra note 7, at 836 (referencing the ability of “ordinary lawyers” to make 
legal judgments based on the law). 
 119. WILLIAM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 
187 (1988); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound,  
44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1243 (1931) (“All that has become clear is that our government is not 
a government of laws, but one of laws through men.”). 
 120. Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 470 (1988). 
 121. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 
834–35 (2008). 
 122. See generally id.; Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 TEX. L. REV. 749 
(2013); Brian Leiter, In Praise of Realism (and Against “Nonsense” Jurisprudence), 100 GEO. L.J. 
865 (2012). 
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Legal Realists are looking at social facts—i.e., the actual practice of 
law—to determine what the consensus of officials is on legal 
questions and, consequently, what the law is. 
Thus, positivist originalism’s, and original-law originalism’s, 
focus on actual legal practice and the social facts of judicial results 
and opinions are not new. That is what everybody has been focusing on. 
The purported novelty of positivist originalism is that we can 
understand the law by only looking at a limited set of data—
namely judicial results and opinions. But that too is not new; that is 
just Legal Formalism, which holds that the traditionally recognized 
sources of law—the constitution, statutes, regulations, judicial 
precedent, etc.—provide “logical, mechanical, and deliberative” 
results and that the vast majority of legal officials abide by and 
apply these results.123 Yet the debate between Legal Realists and 
Legal Formalists has been raging for generations. It clearly cannot 
be settled by just looking at our practice of law. It is our very 
practice of law that is the genesis of the debate. 
Indeed, there is good evidence that positivist originalism and 
original-law originalism are simply wrong about what are the 
relevant social facts to decide how our judges decide cases.124 We 
know that our officials have certain core commitments, such as to 
democracy and efficiency. And we know that our officials are 
generally erudite and reflective about how to best accomplish these 
goals.125 Moreover, beyond what judges tell us they use to decide 
cases, there is strong evidence that judges employ these 
considerations in actual cases.126 
The question for the legal positivist in determining the law is 
understanding the official consensus. If we know that a consensus 
of legal officials has certain core commitments, and we can 
 
 123. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: 
How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (2007) (“For the formalists, the judicial 
system is a ‘giant syllogism machine,’ and the judge acts like a ‘highly skilled mechanic.’”). 
 124. See, e.g., Segall, supra note 11, at 326 (raising the Realist critique of  
original-law originalism). 
 125. See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 
(2010); STEPHEN G. BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 
(2006); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, BRANDEIS ON DEMOCRACY (Philippa Strum 
ed., 1995); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003). 
 126. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69, 71 (2009); 
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991) (describing and providing 
examples of the prudential modality of argument, which often sound in efficiency). 
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convincingly show that one particular interpretive methodology 
better furthers or fulfills these core commitments, then in certain 
cases, especially where there is indeterminacy, we could sensibly 
infer that a consensus of legal officials will follow that particular 
interpretive methodology. Thus, if such social facts obtain, then 
theoretical debates about interpretation will also be important in 
our consideration of what the law is. 
Indeed, Baude and Sachs seemingly endorse this picture: 
Positivism might ground law on social practice, but it doesn’t 
reduce law to social practice. On Hart’s own account, some legal 
rules might reflect practice directly, but the vast majority do so 
only indirectly, involving some degree of inference from practice-
supported premises. Individual results are derived from legal 
rules, which are derived, in turn, from yet more fundamental legal 
rules—terminating, on Hart’s account, in an ultimate rule of 
recognition, the “complex, but normally concordant, practice of 
the courts, officials, and private persons in identifying the law by 
reference to certain criteria.” . . . As these consequences illustrate, 
so long as we share certain kinds of premises, a positivist 
approach can still reform our surface-level practices and resolve 
apparent disagreements. In the same way, originalism can be a 
correct descriptive account of our legal system, even if few people 
would currently describe our system that way.127 
Baude and Sachs correctly recognize that legal positivism 
utilizes inference, from social facts, to determine what the law is 
and that those inferences may be indirect and complex. It is 
surprising then that Baude and Sachs think that we can limit the 
universe of relevant social facts to judicial results and opinion 
language. There is clearly more relevant data to what judges 
actually do, even if the relationships are not obvious at first glance. 
And once we open up the inquiry to the other data—which sound 
in moral commitments, the nature of democracy and authority, the 
nature of interpretation—we have no hope of resolving what our 
law is without consideration of the theoretical debates.128 
 
 127. Baude & Sachs, Grounding Originalism, supra note 7, at 1464–65 (emphasis omitted). 
 128. There is a sense in which Baude and Sachs can claim to avoid these debates: they 
can observe that they need not resolve these questions on the merits. Rather, they can simply 
address the debates at the level of what judges’ and other officials’ views on these debates 
are. That is true. But that seems to be a significant concession for the positivist originalist. 
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The upshot is that the positivist nature of positivist originalism 
and original-law originalism does not dictate that these theories only 
look to particular features of our legal practice, like judicial 
behavior in prior results and opinion language. The key question is 
what legal officials, informed by their internal perspectives, will do 
when confronted with a particular situation. That is part of the 
definition of the law, according to the legal positivist, in light of the 
social facts thesis. And so, according to the legal positivist, you 
must consider the social facts that will help determine what a 
consensus of legal officials will do. In determining what the law is, 
you ignore potentially relevant social facts at your peril. 
Baude and Sachs’s method of only looking to judicial results, 
opinion language, resulting lawyer behavior, and the like to 
determine our law does not arise from legal positivism. It is a 
separate and distinct claim that, to determine what a consensus of 
legal officials will do and thus what the law is, it is enough to look 
at judicial results, opinion language, and lawyer behavior. It 
amounts to a type of bespoke Legal Formalism.129 
And, in our legal practice, it is likely false. There is compelling 
evidence, anecdotal and data-based, that other considerations are 
highly useful in determining what a consensus of legal officials will 
do. Some of those considerations are rooted in theoretical questions 
of morality, interpretation, and linguistics. Thus, the positive turn 
for originalism cannot avoid those theoretical debates because 
those theoretical debates are interwoven in key social facts about 
our legal practice.130 
 
For one, it seems that most involved in these debates would acknowledge that one 
motivation is to persuade others, including judges and officials, to adopt their view. Second, 
there is a close connection between debating theoretical questions on their merits and 
debating whether judges—who are able and qualified—should adopt a particular view on 
those theoretical questions. Such a concession by the positivist originalist would reveal that 
not much would change in the practice of law and legal discourse, adopting the positivist 
originalist lens. Third, it would fall short of the promised empirical and historical conditions 
of validation of the law, as I discuss infra Section IV.B. I thank Mitch Berman for raising  
this point. 
 129. Eric J. Segall, Originalism as Faith, 102 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 37, 51–52 (2016) 
(“This new turn to originalism as ‘our law’ is really nothing more than taking the Court’s 
decisions as ‘law’ as a matter of faith because logic, precedent, legal reasoning, and certainly 
original meaning, simply can’t get the job done.”). 
 130. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Pojanowski & Kevin C. Walsh, Enduring Originalism,  
105 GEO. L.J. 97, 112 (2016) (arguing that social facts about the purpose of constitutional 
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IV. ORIGINAL-LAW ORIGINALISM IS FACTUALLY NOT OUR LAW 
The next question is whether positivist originalism, and 
specifically original-law originalism, are in fact our law. On this 
point, we can return to our schematization of Baude and Sachs’s 
core argument: Premise 2 states that original-law originalism is 
supported by the right kind of social facts. Thus, in combination 
with Premise 1 that the law is whatever is supported by the right 
kind of social fact, we could conclude that original-law originalism 
is our law. Here, I claim that original-law originalism is either 
(1) not supported by the right kind of social facts, or (2) is supported 
by the right kind of social facts but is an uncontroversially true 
theory that is meaningless and thereby fails to be originalist. 
Before we assess the claim, we must set forth some parameters 
for the analysis. The first point to recognize is that we are seeking a 
description of the positive law, i.e., what our law actually is. 
Original-law originalism, and any competing theory, are 
 
interpretation are important to the operation of constitutional interpretation and therefore 
arguing for a natural law grounding of constitutional originalism). 
Baude and Sachs may riposte that they are simply taking their cues from Hart, who 
focused on judicial results and opinion language. But such a response would confuse Hart’s 
point. In the toughest cases, like those at the apex appellate level, Hart recognized that there 
would be no consensus—and thus no law. In such cases, Hart maintained that judges would 
have to appeal to extralegal considerations to decide the case, such as those sounding in 
morality and other theoretical debates. HART, supra note 101, at 124–36. But that is precisely 
what positivist originalism and original-law originalism are concocted to avoid. So, they 
cannot take shelter in Hart’s view, if there is to be law at all in the tough cases. 
Baude and Sachs may also say that whatever the law is, that is to be resolved by the 
internal point of view of officials, and our officials—that is, judges—license the narrow 
universe of sources. This misunderstands the internal point of view and its relation to the 
rule of recognition. The internal point of view is a practical attitude of rule acceptance taken 
by officials. But understanding the internal point of view does not mean we must accept 
what judges believe, or claim to believe, is the rule of recognition, if that is gainsaid by their 
actual practices. It is possible that judges mistakenly believe the rule of recognition is X, but 
their convergent practices reveal that it is Y. In such a case, the rule of recognition is fixed by 
the actual practices—and thus it is Y. For example, suppose a society’s judges believe that in 
cases involving individuals against corporations, they are faithfully employing 
textualist/originalist interpretation—but, in fact, nearly every case turns out in favor of 
corporations. One may understand that the rule of recognition includes a criterion to favor 
corporate interests. Even if the judges do not realize that criterion, it is still part of the rule of 
recognition. And that is not contradicted by the requirement of the internal point of view, 
because judges can actually have a practical attitude of acceptance to such a rule, even if they 
would not describe the governing rule that way. But to be clear, I think this kind of situation 
is mostly food for theory. In practice, judges—as individuals and on the whole—are 
perceptive and self-reflective enough to understand the apparent and underlying criteria by 
which they decide cases. I thank Charles Barzun for bringing my attention to this argument. 
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explanations of what our law actually is.131 And thus, in 
determining whether our law is original-law originalism, we are 
asking whether original-law originalism accounts for the data of 
how our law is actually practiced. 
Also, there is a critical distinction to observe between validating 
a decision as employing a particular interpretive methodology and 
validating a decision as correct. For example, an opinion can be 
normative originalist, in that it lexically prioritizes original 
meaning in the determination of the meaning of the constitutional 
provision and consequently the law. But it could also be factually 
wrong because it incorrectly assumes that the opinion of one 
idiosyncratic framer was dispositive of the contrary contemporary 
public opinion. And an opinion can also be incompatible with 
normative originalism in that it prioritizes, say, contemporary 
societal morality or practicalities over the original meaning of a 
constitutional provision in deciding the case.132 
Next, in seeking such an explanation for the law, and an 
accounting of the data of our legal practice, it is acceptable, and 
perhaps inevitable, that there will be data that cannot be accounted 
for. It may be the case that original-law originalism cannot explain 
particular one-off decisions, where an official departs from the 
interpretive methodology. We cannot expect complete compliance 
of all legal officials. And in such cases, we can say that such 
decisions were not in conformity of the law.133 But if original-law 
originalism cannot account for core features of our law, that reveals 
a serious problem. Taking our prior example, if original-law 
originalism cannot account for Brown, and requires that Brown is 
contrary to the law, that is contrary to the social facts because Brown 
is a fixed star of our current legal practice, and thus original-law 
originalism would have failed as an explanation of our law.134 
 
 131. E.g., Sachs, Legal Change, supra note 7, at 818; Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, supra 
note 7, at 2351. 
 132. Baude & Sachs, Originalism’s Bite, supra note 7, at 104–05 (discussing this 
distinction and falsifiability). I leave open the question whether a decision employing the 
wrong methodology can be correct. One could reasonably take the view that the 
methodology is critical to the result, but one could also be focused only on the result, or 
potentially some hybrid positions. 
 133. Baude & Sachs, Grounding Originalism, supra note 7, at 1468–70. 
 134. In the context of Barzun’s schematization of the argument, original-law 
originalism would not be supported by the right social facts, because of the critical social fact 
that there is a strong consensus of officials that regards Brown as binding on official action. 
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Additionally, our focus must be on what legal officials—most 
importantly judges—actually do or would do. As discussed above, 
judicial opinions are surely important data points, but they may not 
be the only data points. Moreover, if what judges say in their 
opinions is not the basis for sound inference about what judges 
actually do or would do, then they are not good data points to 
determine what the law is. For example, suppose it is the case that, 
in the most cases, judges employ the following methodology: They 
first start with the plain meaning of the text. If that does not resolve 
the case, then judges consider societal morality. And whatever 
result they determine, they attempt to justify that result with 
something grounded in the original meaning of the text or by 
original methods employed at the time of the text. In this simplified 
example, original-law originalism is not the law because it is not 
what the judges are actually utilizing to determine the answers to 
legal questions. The judges are actually using this societal-morality 
methodology to determine the answers to legal questions. This is 
the interpretive methodology that is the law. Indeed, if attorneys 
knew all of this, their briefs would devote their most serious 
attention to the society-morality arguments—not the original-law 
originalist arguments (though they might include original-law 
originalist arguments to tell judges how they can dress the 
opinion). As discussed above, positivism tells us that the law 
critically depends on what judges and other officials do. And we 
have to be vigilant for the social facts that tell us what those 
convergent practices actually are. 
Relatedly, it is not enough that a data set show that judges 
employ a particular methodology, if there is sufficiently convincing 
information that they would depart from that methodology in 
hypothetical or novel cases. For example, suppose that at a 
particular point in time, a number of cases arising under the Fourth 
Amendment appear to utilize originalist methodology. But 
suppose we believe that is chiefly because most of the Fourth 
Amendment cases were fairly straightforward. And suppose we 
anticipate that, with respect to claims relating to new technologies 
like thermal imaging, facial recognition, GPS tracking, and the like, 
judges will likely engage in pluralist, nonoriginalist jurisprudence. 
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That, then, may provide compelling evidence that our 
jurisprudence is not originalist.135 
Finally, consider arguments that proceed to show that the 
results of nonoriginalist decisions could be achieved through 
originalist jurisprudence—that is, decisions that employ originalist 
methodology. Those arguments do not show that our law is 
originalist. Indeed, by their own terms, they cannot. They 
recognize, and therefore concede, that those decisions are 
nonoriginalist. What they do, however, is show that originalism is 
not such a bitter pill—it would not require giving up those 
important results, narrowly construed.136 
With those points in mind, I contend that original-law 
originalism is either not our law or is trivially so, in light of the 
following three observations: (A) there are foundational aspects of 
our legal reasoning that have evolved greatly since the founding 
such that they are not original methods; (B) if viewed expansively, 
original-law originalist methodology describes every reasonable 
approach to interpretation and fails to provide historical, empirical 
validation and falsification criteria; and (C) the putative evidence 
for original-law originalism is inconclusive and there is strong 
contrary evidence. 
A. The Evolution of Purported Original Methods 
Recall that the structure of original-law originalism allows 
within its ambit of decision the rules that were valid at the time of 
the founding and lawful changes of those rules, either through 
formal amendment or accepted doctrines of change.137 One method 
of change—recognized by Baude and Sachs—is that of stare decisis 
and precedent. And, indeed, it has come a long way since  
the founding. 
Consider, for example, the textualization of precedent that  
has occurred in American law over the last two centuries.138  
 
 135. Such evidence may be hard to come by, but do not fight the hypothetical. 
 136. In that sense, what these arguments do is sound in the explanatory desideratum 
of conservatism because they show that embracing originalism would not require giving up 
important background beliefs and theories. Brian Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, 
76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215, 1239 (2009). 
 137. See supra Section II.A. 
 138. Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1187, 1222 
(2007) (discussing the evolution of precedent to focus on the text of judicial opinions). 
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Peter M. Tiersma’s scholarship explains that “[a] hundred years ago 
judges tended to express their opinions in conceptual terms . . . . 
Recently, they have become inclined to lay down fixed rules and 
principles . . . .”139 Early opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court did not 
often reduce the holding (or ratio decidendi) to writing that was 
easily quotable.140 Rather, the opinions would set forth the various 
reasons for the judgment, and perhaps those opposing the 
judgment as well, and simply set forth the ruling of the court.141 
Indeed, until the early 1800s, Supreme Court opinions were 
delivered seriatim, with each sitting Justice delivering their own 
opinion, one after another.142 As a consequence, whether in seriatim 
form or as a collective opinion, determining the ratio decidendi  
or holding of a case required sophisticated legal reasoning.  
Doing so would require analyzing the relationship of the facts  
to the outcome of the case, in light of the various reasons set forth 
by the Court. And in cases of seriatim decisions, that might  
also require reconciling multiple opinions that were not  
necessarily concordant.143 
Of course, today, our practice is very different. Now, courts 
tend to simply and explicitly state the instant case’s holding in the 
opinion.144 And while there is always room to distinguish cases 
based on specific factual circumstances, the text of the opinion, and 
the textual articulation of the court’s holding, has a distinct weight 
compared to prior history. As Robert F. Nagel has observed, the 
Court has increasingly made use of elaborate and detailed tests and 
standards in “an obvious effort to achieve control and 
consistency”—in essence to be more statute-like.145 “In modern 
decisions [and unlike in the earlier era], judges are bound not 
merely by simple and undefined maxims nor by the mysterious 
 
 139. Id. at 1190. 
 140. Id. at 1248 (“Courts certainly did not lay [the ratio decidendi] out on a platter for 
easy consumption.”). 
 141. Id. at 1248–49; id. at 1223–24 (providing the example of Georgia v. Brailsford,  
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402 (1792)). 
 142. Id. at 1223; id. at 1230 (stating that Chief Justice Marshall eliminated the practice 
when he was appointed to the Court in 1801). 
 143. Id. at 1248–49. 
 144. Id. at 1248; Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455, 1455 (1995) 
(“It is a routine charge against contemporary judicial opinions that they read more like 
statutes than like opinions of a court.”). 
 145. Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165, 178 (1985). 
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flux of prior cases, but by rules that are specific and multiple.”146 
Nevertheless, it is important for us to recognize that this was not 
always the case, and not even fairly recently.147 
Practically, the difference in the operation of precedent and 
stare decisis is striking. One way to see this is by considering the 
current operation of the Marks rule. That rule, coming from Marks 
v. United States, states that when there is a fragmented Court such 
that no single opinion garners the votes of a majority of the Court, 
the holding is the narrowest grounds on which the concurring 
Justices agree.148 In such fractured decisions, determining what the 
holding is—by piecing together the narrowest grounds from the 
various opinions—has proven to be confusing and contentious.149 
It is usually not straightforward, and generally requires discursive, 
particularized reasoning not governed solely by the text. And, 
indeed, the method of the Marks rule is similar to that of 
determining holdings from seriatim opinions or from various 
opinions employing discursive, particularized, fact-sensitive 
reasoning. The substantial frustration with the Marks rule shows 
that it is unlike the common application of precedent and stare 
decisis of our current practice.150 Our current practice features 
opinions that generally set forth clear, textual holdings, which are 
then utilized by lawyers and judges. To be sure, our current practice 
includes discursive, particularized, and fact-sensitive reading of 
cases, but that is in addition to, and less favored than, the more 
textualized method of reading cases.151 
 
 146. Id. at 197; Tiersma, supra note 138, at 1254. 
 147. Tiersma, supra note 138, at 1248–49 (detailing scholars’ views in the mid-1900s that 
the text of the opinion does not control the result); see also Jim Evans, Change in the Doctrine 
of Precedent During the Nineteenth Century, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 35, 57–63  
(Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987) (observing that the development of stare decisis as a firm 
doctrine only began in the late 1800s). 
 148. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
 149. Richard M. Re, Beyond the Marks Rule, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1942, 1944 (2019) 
(“Unfortunately, the Marks rule has generated considerable confusion.”); id. at 1952–54 
(discussing instances of conflicting readings). Indeed, very recently, the application of the 
Marks rule has created significant confusion in Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020), 
regarding determining the precedential status of Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972). 
 150. Re, supra note 149, at 1944–47. 
 151. Baude and Sachs may contend that this is too restrictive an understanding of the 
founding, and that they are really pointing to the more fully realized judicial tradition after 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). By that point, under Chief Justice John 
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Thus, based on the history, this means that core features of our 
current practice of law—namely, the way opinions encapsulating 
the judgment are written, the way precedent is established by 
courts, and the way precedent is interpreted and understood by 
future courts—are significantly different from how those core 
features of the practice of law were during the founding era (and, 
also, during Reconstruction). The creation and interpretation of 
precedent and stare decisis are important pathways to change the 
law from the supposed original meaning. We use these methods 
now, and our use of them is highly textualized. And, though stare 
decisis was a part of the original law and the original methods, that 
incarnation was not so textualized. Judges did not fashion tests of 
necessary or sufficient conditions. Instead, judges considered the 
facts, and provided reasons for judgment that were specific to those 
facts. Those reasons were primarily for the case at hand, and 
whether they would transpose to the next case was a problem for 
the next case. It was a particularist jurisprudence. And there may 
have been good reasons for such a methodology.152 But, whatever 
that case, our form of precedent and stare decisis—which is highly 
textualized—was not part of our founding-era law—and yet it  
is now. 
The import for original-law originalism is substantial. As we 
saw, original-law originalism’s core thesis depends on Premise 2 in 
our schematization, namely that the right kind of social facts 
support original-law originalism. And that point can be understood 
as original-law originalism being a sufficiently good explanation of 
our law. But here is strong evidence that the very core of our 
practice of law—the precedent of the common law system—is not 
part of original-law originalism. That means original-law 
originalism cannot account for our current practice of law. Thus, 
original-law originalism is not a good explanation of our current 
 
Marshall, there were far fewer seriatim decisions. Tiersma, supra note 138, at 1230.  
Even removing seriatim decisions from the picture, there was still a strong tradition of 
utilizing discursive opinions that did not textualize the holdings of the case, which extended 
well beyond the founding era. That is enough to sustain the point that stare decisis itself has 
greatly changed since the founding era. I thank Joshua Braver for pressing this point. 
 152. It could be that judges thought fashioning tests was all too much a legislative role 
and thus considered it beyond their institutional authority or institutional competence. Or it 
could be that judges thought that it was an inferior way of decision making. Or perhaps it 
was merely adherence to tradition. 
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legal practice and, consequently, the right kind of socials facts do 
not support the practice of law. 
To be clear, stare decisis and precedent are certainly not the 
only features of our current legal practice that are inexplicable by 
reference to original-law originalism.153 For example, in recent 
scholarship, Baude himself has argued that the doctrine of qualified 
immunity is not justifiably part of our law, as it is “unlawful and 
inconsistent with conventional principles of statutory 
interpretation.”154 And we could extrapolate that qualified 
immunity is not consistent with original-law originalism. Thus, 
original-law originalism will have an apparent deficit in explaining 
our legal practice because qualified immunity is part of our law. 
And similarly, in Originalism’s Bite, Baude and Sachs list a number 
of cases that they suspect cannot be validated by original-law 
originalism.155 Those are deficits in original-law originalism 
because they are actual features of our law that cannot be explained 
 
 153. Also consider inference. By “inference” I mean to include logic, the forms of 
reasoning, and our various analytical tools to draw out conclusions from data. Inference in 
the law allows us to draw conclusions from particular propositions of law to others. It is a 
way of expounding upon the law, and thus it expands—and changes—the law. 
What is also clear is that the founding era’s understanding of inference is less 
developed than ours today. In particular, there have been great developments in statistics, 
with a great many sophisticated tools to isolate the impact of particular variables in a 
multivariable system. And these tools can be particularly useful in determining racial and 
gender bias in various official actions—relevant to inter alia claims made under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. But, because these would not be available methods of inference at 
the founding or the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments, they seemingly would not 
be available under original-law originalism. 
However, that is not what the courts say. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 
293–94 (1987) (stating that “[t]he Court has accepted statistics as proof of intent to 
discriminate in certain limited contexts”; establishing the high standards that must be met; 
and giving examples when they have been met, including with modern techniques like 
“multiple-regression analysis”); Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 637–38 (7th Cir. 
2001) (“The Supreme Court has long noted the importance of statistical analysis ‘in cases in 
which the existence of discrimination is a disputed issue.’ While few opinions directly 
acknowledge that statistics may be used to prove discriminatory effect, the Court has 
repeatedly relied on statistics to do just that.” (citations omitted)). 
As of yet, there are few cases that have had evidence sufficient to meet the statistical 
standard. But one would expect that to change with time, as inter alia our data collection 
capabilities become stronger. The question is whether our officials would actually use those 
statistical inferential techniques to expand the scope of, for example, Equal Protection, or not. 
If they would, then that does indicate that our law—what our officials would do and thus 
our officials’ convergent practices—are not original-law originalist. 
 154. William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 45 (2018). 
 155. Baude & Sachs, Originalism’s Bite, supra note 7, at 108. 
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by original-law originalism. However, if limited in number, such 
deviations may be acceptable to Baude and Sachs because there can 
be mistaken cases.156 Their theory could simply say that those 
doctrines and cases are not in conformity with our law, or that they 
were not in conformity with our law when decided but have 
become part of our law through original-law originalist processes. 
But notice that is not possible with stare decisis and precedent. 
Those are fixed-star features of our legal practice. So, Baude and 
Sachs cannot credibly suggest that they are not in conformity with 
our law. And seemingly neither can they suggest that they have 
become part of our law through original-law originalist processes, 
due to construction of original-law originalism that focuses on 
methods available at the founding. I say “seemingly,” because 
Baude and Sachs have not had a chance to address it, and I am not 
sure what they would say. Thinking as charitably as I can, perhaps 
they may claim that stare decisis and precedent are included in 
original-law originalism because (1) their present forms are close 
enough to the earlier forms or (2) even if far apart, their present 
forms’ evolution is easily traceable. In principle, neither of these 
responses is out of bounds, but I think they both exacerbate the 
problem I consider next: such an original-law originalism is so 
capacious that it is meaningless. 
B. Original-Law Originalism’s Lack of Meaning 
The next question is whether original-law originalism  
proffers meaningful claims about our interpretive methodology. 
Here, my claims are dual: First, under the necessarily expansive 
view, nearly all cases employ an original-law originalist 
methodology. Second, original-law originalism does not have 
historical, empirical criteria of legal validation or falsification that 
do not appeal to theoretical debates. 
1. Original-law originalism is an expansive method of interpretation 
To begin, consider how Baude and Sachs operationalize 
original-law originalism. Per their definitions, they suggest that any 
methodology that uses any mode of argumentation common in the 
founding era law is original-law originalist. This is already rather 
 
 156. Baude & Sachs, Grounding Originalism, supra note 7, at 1468–70. 
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expansive, given the robust and discursive quality of legal 
argumentation at the founding. 
As an initial observation, on this understanding, any opinion 
that uses doctrinal, precedent-based argument is one attempting to 
employ an original-law originalist methodology.157 But most every 
opinion cites prior precedent, hence they would all employ 
original-law originalism. 
Indeed, this is bolstered by Baude and Sachs’s response  
to Barzun. Barzun observes that we simply do not require  
that interpretive rules be tracked back to the founding. Barzun 
argues that historical grounding of rules is not to trace the pedigree 
to the founding, but rather to argue that the law’s endurance is 
indicative of its acceptance and feasibility.158 Consequently, 
according to Barzun, our practice of law does not actually trace  
the pedigree of putative legal propositions to the original primary 
rules through their lawful changes—and thus that our law is not 
original-law originalism.159 
Baude and Sachs contend that this criticism requires too much, 
ignoring the “ordinary norms of citation and opinion-writing.”160 
They acknowledge that opinions do not often have an explicit and 
complete tracing of the founding pedigree.161 But that is because a 
complete tracing is not always necessary. Opinions may cite the 
U.S. Code, without looking at the underlying statutes, because they 
are almost always the same. And, similarly, opinions may cite prior 
opinions in good repute, assuming that they operated under a 
 
 157. This is of course subject to the caveats of the prior section, supra Section IV.A. 
At this juncture, one question is how Baude and Sachs reconcile the fact that some of 
these argumentative moves that are part of our practice may not enjoy consensus judicial 
support as required by Hartian positivism. Baude and Sachs have two options: First, they 
can disclaim that these argumentative moves are part of the law, because they do not seem 
to enjoy consensus judicial support. But their resulting theory would need to admit that there 
is not law in many appellate cases, which would contravene their claim that they can provide 
empirical, historical criteria to recognize the law. Second, they can contend that there is 
indirect or oblique consensus support, from which we can obtain empirical, historical criteria 
to recognize the law. For the rest of this section, I assume that Baude and Sachs opt for the 
second road. 
 158. Baude & Sachs, Grounding Originalism, supra note 7, at 1478 (citing Barzun,  
supra note 9, at 1349–50). 
159.  Id.  
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 1478–82. 
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similarly proper methodology.162 Moreover, Baude and Sachs are 
eager to embrace “customary law” as part of original-law 
originalism because that was part of the law at the founding.163 So, 
according to Baude and Sachs, even if as Barzun suggests, the 
reasons for application of prior precedent are not due to the 
authority of the original law, but rather because of the worth of law 
that has managed to survive, that is still employing the 
methodology original-law originalism.164 
Then consider Philip C. Bobbitt’s six modalities of 
constitutional argument.165 They are: 
[H]istorical (relying on the intentions of the framers and ratifiers 
of the Constitution); textual (looking to the meaning of the words 
of the Constitution alone, as they would be interpreted by the 
average contemporary ‘man on the street’); structural (inferring 
rules from the relationships that the Constitution mandates 
among the structures it sets up); doctrinal (applying rules 
generated by precedent); ethical (deriving rules from those moral 
commitments of the American ethos that are reflected in the 
Constitution); and prudential (seeking to balance the costs and 
benefits of a particular rule).166 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 1483. 
 164. Earlier, Baude seemed to have a narrower view of what would count as original-
law originalist. He suggested that, to be in accord with original-law originalism, arguments 
must in fact track “originalist pedigree,” not merely coincide with original-law originalism, 
arguments cannot be consequentialist, and arguments cannot “affirmatively reject[] the 
primary authority of the Framers or the constitutional text.” Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 
supra note 7, at 2397–98. Nor can they be forms of strong originalism that would reject 
founding-era methods, like stare decisis. Id. at 2398. 
But this poses a trouble, because, for example, it is not at all obvious that judges are 
actually tracking originalist pedigree. Perhaps they are employing a pluralist methodology 
that relies on different types of arguments to support their conclusion—without a concern 
for pedigree, but rather a focus on acceptance and feasibility. Indeed, this was the heart of 
Barzun’s challenge. And if they are not tracking pedigree, then original-law originalism fails 
in describing our law. 
In a similar vein, there are numerous examples of consequentialist arguments that, in 
Baude’s words, “rest on [their] own bottom” and are part of our law. BOBBITT, supra note 126, 
at 12–13 (describing and providing examples of prudential arguments, which employ 
consequentialist thinking). So, if original-law originalism excludes those, then it has a major 
deficit in describing our law. 
 165. BOBBITT, supra note 126, at 12–13. 
 166. Id. 
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Though Bobbitt is careful to inform that he is not suggesting a 
taxonomy that covers all constitutional argument—there may be 
others—he is making the claim that most constitutional argument 
fits in at least one of these six buckets. And indeed, Bobbitt provides 
convincing evidence that each of these forms of constitutional 
argument is pedigreed.167 But if that is right, then really every 
opinion employing one of Bobbitt’s modalities—and we should 
think that is most every one—would also be employing the 
original-law originalist methodology. 
This is further exacerbated by the issue we considered earlier. I 
proffered reason to think that critical forms of argumentation—like 
from stare decisis and precedent—are significantly different than at 
the founding, such that they should not be considered within the 
ambit of original-law originalism. But if the original-law originalist 
ripostes that they are included because they are close cousins or 
reasonable evolutions of the prior founding-era forms, then it is 
hard to see what kind of methodology used by a rational court 
would fail to employ original-law originalism. Original-law 
originalism was defined to include the original meaning of rules, 
supplemented (or supplanted) by the rules formed from the 
original methods of changing those rules; this would add to that 
the supplemented (or supplanting) rules formed from methods of 
changing those rules that have in turn evolved from the original 
rules. That would again seem to cover most every reasonably 
written opinion. 
Of course, if it is not right that the modalities of argument are 
sufficiently pedigreed or that original-law originalism is meant to 
include evolutions of methods of change, then that poses another 
problem for the original-law originalist: That would reveal a form 
of constitutional argumentation that is commonly used but not part 
of original-law originalism. And that in itself would be compelling 
evidence that our law is actually not original-law originalist. 
 
 167. Historical, textual, and doctrinal arguments are all arguably modes of argumentation 
from the founding era. See generally id. (discussing these modes of argumentation). 
And in a similar vein, we could consider Fallon’s typology of constitutional argument 
into textual, framers’ intent, constitutional theory, precedent, and value arguments. Each of 
these has sufficient pedigree and thus would be part of the original-law originalist 
methodology. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1194–1210 (1987). 
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* * * 
The arguable capaciousness seems concerning. It strikes me as 
curious to say that a particular methodology dominates nearly 
every opinion written in our current legal practice. Consider other 
methodologies, say, original-public-meaning originalism (a variety 
of a normative originalism), pragmatism, or some variety of 
pluralism. To each of these theories, there are real examples that do 
not conform. As discussed above, Brown is a good example of an 
opinion that is unlikely to fit the original-public-meaning 
originalist mold. And an originalist opinion—for example, District 
of Columbia v. Heller168—is unlikely to fit a pragmatist mode. But to 
the original-law originalist theory, it is hard to imagine a duly 
written opinion that would fail to conform. Perhaps, an opinion 
that used a coin-flip to decide a case would fail, but that is the kind 
of extreme example it would take. 
Of course, that it is so ubiquitous is no death knell for the 
theory. Indeed, Baude and Sachs may embrace this result. After all, 
they do claim that original-law originalism is our practice of law, 
that it is supported by the right type of social facts in that the 
convergent practices of officials conforms to that methodology.169 
So, they might say that it should be no surprise that nearly every 
opinion follows suit. 
What I fear, however, is that the import of original-law 
originalism is anodyne. Given all the forms of argumentation it 
encompasses, to say that original-law originalism is our law seems 
like nothing more than the claim that our law is a common-law 
tradition, which was fairly mature at the time of the founding. 
 
 168. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). In Heller, the Supreme Court 
held that the Second Amendment covers a right to keep and carry a personal firearm in the 
home. Id. at 629. The Supreme Court reasoned, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, that 
the public meaning of the Second Amendment entailed such a right. Id. at 576–77. Though 
one might be able to fish out prudential arguments out of the opinion, the opinion’s primary 
focus is a lengthy discussion of history and text. 
Some may contend that Heller was not in fact an originalist opinion. I take no position 
on the originalist bona fides of Heller. Another stand-in originalist opinion may be Crawford 
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), where the Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, 
looked to the text and history of the Confrontation Clause to reverse a criminal conviction 
sustained in part by an incriminating statement from a witness who could not be confronted 
at trial. Regardless, my point is just to observe that a truly originalist opinion—whatever it 
is—is unlikely to fit a pragmatist mode of interpretation. 
 169. This is just a restatement of Premise 2 in the schematization of the argument. See 
supra Section II.D. 
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Recall that Baude and Sachs insist that “[t]he original-law approach 
may be capacious in theory, but it’s ‘exacting in application.’”170 
What we have seen, however, is that exactingness is not borne out 
in determining whether an opinion is employing original-law 
originalist methodology. 
2. Original-law originalism lacks criteria for legal validation  
and falsification 
Nor do I think that exactingness is shown in original-law 
originalism’s validation and falsification conditions. Indeed, I 
contend original-law originalism lacks any meaningful conditions. 
The first step is to identify the putative falsification (or, on the 
flip side, the validation) conditions. My understanding is that the 
falsification conditions can be obtained from what original-law 
originalism tells us is the law. As we saw previously with the 
recursive definition, original-law originalism is made up of the 
original meaning of the primary rules, presumably extracted from 
the constitutional text, unless lawfully changed by an original 
method of lawful change. 
Thus, the test for validation proceeds as follows: 
Is the putative proposition of law in accord with the original 
meaning of the constitutional rules/text? 
(a) If so, has that relevant original meaning of the 
constitution rules/text been lawfully changed at a prior 
time? 
(1) If so, is the putative proposition of law in accord with 
the constitutional rules/text as it has been lawfully 
changed? 
(i) If yes, then the putative rule is validated by original-
law originalism.  
(ii) If not, the putative rule is invalidated. 
(2) If the relevant meaning has not been lawfully changed, 
then the putative rule is validated by original-law 
originalism. 
(b) If the putative proposition is not in accord with the 
relevant original meaning, has that relevant original 
 
 170. Baude & Sachs, Grounding Originalism, supra note 7, at 1458 (citing Baude & Sachs, 
Originalism’s Bite, supra note 7, at 104). 
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meaning of the constitution rules/text been lawfully 
changed at a prior time? 
(1) If so, is the putative proposition of law in accord with 
the constitutional rules/text as it has been lawfully 
changed?
(i) If yes, then the putative rule is validated by original- 
law originalism.  
(ii) If not, the putative rule is invalidated. 
(2) If the relevant original meaning has not been lawfully 
changed, the putative rule is invalidated. 
 
Thus, we can observe that there are three conditions under 
which a putative proposition of law is invalidated by original-law 
originalism: (a)(1)(ii), (b)(1)(ii), and (b)(2): 
(a)(1)(ii) — So it could be that a putative rule is in line with the 
original meaning of the constitutional rules, but that the 
constitutional rules had been lawfully changed and so the putative 
rule is invalid on the basis of not keeping up with the changes. An 
important caveat here is that it may be the case that reversion to 
original meaning is always an appropriate way of lawfully 
changing (back) the law.171 If that is the case, then there is no way 
 
 171. Or it may not. That is not clear from Baude and Sachs’s exposition of original-law 
originalism. I think this remains an important question for Baude and Sachs to answer about 
their interpretive theory. 
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to invalidate a putative proposition of law in accord with the 
original meaning of the constitutional rules. 
(b)(1)(ii) — It could also be that the putative rule is not in line 
with the original meaning of the constitutional rules, but they had 
been lawfully changed, and yet still the putative rule is not in 
accord with the lawfully changed constitutional rule. 
(b)(2) — Finally, it could be that the putative rule is not in line 
with the original meaning of the constitutional rules, and the 
constitutional rules had not been lawfully changed. 
Importantly, note that, in most all cases, these putative rules 
will be justified in an opinion setting forth conventional arguments. 
So, first consider condition (a)(1)(ii). If the putative proposition 
of law were invalidated under condition (a)(1)(ii), it would be 
invalidated because it adhered to the original meaning of the law, 
which had subsequently been lawfully changed. This invalidation 
condition is actually decidedly nonoriginalist.172 And, as 
mentioned, if reversion to original meaning is an acceptable way of 
lawfully changing back, and it seemingly should be, then this 
condition will not invalidate any putative rules. 
Now focusing on the latter two criteria, condition (b)(1)(ii) 
invalidates a putative rule when it does not agree with the original 
meaning of the constitutional rules or the constitutional rules as 
lawful changed and condition (b)(2) invalidates a putative rule 
when it does not agree with the original meaning of the 
constitutional rules, which remains in force. Thus, to be clear, in 
either case, if the opinion sets forth a lawful change that validates 
the putative rule, the putative rule is validated. 
How do we assess then the validity of the arguments in the 
opinion that purportedly substantiate that there has been a lawful 
change that validates the putative rule? Preliminarily, there may be 
opinions that set forth a lawful change of the constitutional rules, 
but that changed constitutional rule does not actually sustain the 
putative rule on offer. We can call these incoherent opinions, 
because the reasoning doesn’t support the conclusion. They can be 
invalidated by the original-law originalist test, but that is not 
special—they will be invalidated by any rational interpretive 
methodology. On to nontrivial cases: Using Bobbitt’s typology, 
 
 172. However, Baude and Sachs may suggest that it is original-law originalist. But if 
original-law originalism can only invalidate laws when they actually appeal to original 
meaning, that may be coherent, but it will likely be unsatisfying. 
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some textual, historical, and structural arguments will often sound 
in normative originalism, and so to assess those kinds of arguments 
we may be able to import the validation standards from normative 
originalism. But those arguments also target original meaning, and 
so they do not address the prototypical forms of lawful change of 
the original meaning.173 Most of the arguments that there has been 
a relevant lawful change are going to appear as precedential, 
prudential, ethical, and perhaps structural arguments. And for 
these arguments, Baude and Sachs have not set meaningful 
standards of validation and falsification. 
For example, if an argument is made on the basis of precedent, 
what is the yardstick to decide whether that argument is correct or 
not? Certainly, there are examples in the extreme. In comparing two 
automobile accidents, the color of the driver’s hair and automobile 
may not be relevant distinguishing characteristics.174 But there are 
certainly closer cases when applying precedent. And, generally, we 
would answer whether a case is distinguishable based on external 
standards and principles, to determine whether differences 
between the cases are relevant and important enough to dictate a 
different result.175 
For example, Obergefell v. Hodges considered whether legislation 
prohibiting same-sex marriage violated the Equal Protection and 
Due Process Clauses.176 In holding that such a prohibition was 
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court held that the right to marry 
was protected by the Constitution.177 In so doing, the Court 
analogized to Loving v. Virginia, which held that a ban on interracial 
marriage constituted discrimination based on race, for purposes of 
Equal Protection.178 Of course, there is an obvious distinction that 
Obergefell dealt with sex and same sex-relationships, while Loving 
dealt with race and interracial relationships. But the Court did not 
 
 173. Put another way, if original-law originalism assesses all questions of lawful change 
simply by appeal to normative originalist criteria, it reduces to a variety of normative 
originalism, and it is an unlikely candidate to model our law. 
 174. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 68 (11th prtg. 2008) (providing a 
comically narrow reading of a case as holding that “[t]his rule holds only of redheaded 
Walpoles in pale magenta Buick cars”). 
 175. Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 746 (1993) 
(explaining the process of analogical reasoning in the law and its appeal to 
external principles). 
 176. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 644 (2015). 
 177. Id. at 664. 
 178. Id. (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)). 
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find that distinction relevant in light of some principles, such as that 
sex and race are both immutable characteristics of our identity, the 
importance of loving relationships to human life, the lack of 
necessity for the state to interfere in such consensual relationships, 
and the like.179 
On this front, some interpretive methodologies give us 
standards by which we can evaluate precedential arguments. For 
example, a Posnerian pragmatism may weigh the importance of 
notice interests, the feasibility of rules, and other consequentialist 
interests in deciding whether to apply a particular precedent.180 
Such a theory may not provide definitive answers to the question, 
but it at least provides the criteria on which to judge an argument—
which we can then argue about. Indeed, normative originalist 
theories of interpretation provide us with standards relating to 
conformance and consistency with the original meaning of the 
Constitution, however defined. Of course, that might mean the 
normative originalist theory simply dispenses with all these 
arguments that trespass beyond the bounds of original meaning, 
but that at least provides tangible validation criteria. In contrast, 
however, original-law originalism does not provide us with any 
particular standards to assess different precedential arguments. 
The touchstone for original-law originalism, as a form of positivist 
originalism, is what our practice of law is. But how would that help 
us in this inquiry? In order to get headway, we would have to be 
able to extract some grounding principles of our practice of law. But 
that obviously brings to the forefront theoretical questions of law, 
that relate to inter alia our normative commitments about political 
morality. And on a very similar basis, original-law originalism 
provides no bases to evaluate prudential arguments—because in 
deciding what the “good” is, those too explicitly appeal to 
normative commitments.181 
Moreover, original-law originalism gives us no standards to 
weigh the different types of arguments against each other. Any such 
 
 179. See, e.g., id. at 664–70. 
 180. See generally POSNER, supra note 125 (setting forth Judge Posner’s pragmatic  
theory of adjudication); Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 
(1996) (same). 
 181. Baude and Sachs may retort that they do not need to consider these theoretical 
questions on the merits—they simply must address how judges view these theoretical 




standards would have to be determined from our practice, per the 
positivist focus. But there is simply no consensus on any hierarchy 
of arguments in our practice. Indeed, Bobbitt recognized this in 
observing that conflict between different modalities of argument 
can only be settled by individual conscience, with no hierarchy 
obvious from our practice.182 Baude and Sachs may parrot Bobbitt 
in saying that there simply is no way within original-law 
originalism to decide between such arguments. However, that 
gives away the game because nearly every case at an appellate and 
apex level has some plausible argument in favor of each side of the 
v. Such an admission by Baude and Sachs would mean there are no 
meaningful validation conditions in the majority of Supreme Court 
cases.183 In a Hartian spirit, Baude and Sachs might embrace this 
conclusion. But then it is unclear how positivist originalism and 
original-law originalism could provide empirical and historical 
conditions for determining the law. How would original-law 
originalism be “exacting in application[?]”184 
Consider two of Baude and Sachs’s examples of cases that fail 
the test of original-law originalism: Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. 
Blaisdell185, and Wickard v. Filburn.186 It is not clear to me why these 
cases fail the validation conditions of original-law originalism. 
At issue in Blaisdell was the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium 
Law, which provided that, during the Great Depression and the 
consequent housing crisis, state courts could equitably postpone 
foreclosures.187 After the mortgagor foreclosed on their home, the 
Blaisdells brought suit to take advantage of the Law.188 The trial 
judge dismissed the case, on the basis that it violated the Contract 
 
 182. BOBBITT, supra note 126, at 184; J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional 
Grammar, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1771, 1795 (1994) (“In Bobbitt’s view, the equal status of the 
modalities means, by definition, that there is no way, within the modal structure itself, to 
resolve conflicting interpretations across modalities. Instead, Bobbitt argues that only the 
interpreter’s conscience can resolve conflicts between the modalities.”). 
 183. Baude and Sachs could also argue that there is simply no need for consensus at 
that level of specificity. But then the question arises on what basis we decide between the 
different kinds of arguments. If there is no basis, we have no validation criteria, and if there 
is some other basis not found in consensus, it must implicate theoretical questions that Baude 
and Sachs claim their theory can bypass. 
 184. Baude & Sachs, Grounding Originalism, supra note 7, at 1458 (citing Baude & Sachs, 
Originalism’s Bite, supra note 7, at 104). 
 185. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444 (1934). 
 186. Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 187. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 415–16. 
 188. Id. at 418–19. 
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Clause and the case wended its way to the U.S. Supreme Court.189 
The Court held that the Law did not violate the Contract Clause.190 
In so doing, the Court affirmed the limitations of the Constitution, 
writing “[e]mergency does not create power.”191 But the Court 
marshaled inter alia structural arguments about the nature of the 
state police power in relation to the Contract Clause,192 textual 
arguments about the specificity of the Contract Clause,193 and 
precedential arguments all in favor of upholding the legislation.194 
All of these forms of argument are familiar to our practice of law 
and would have been familiar at the founding. Apart from the 
textual arguments, which may be false under an examination of the 
original meaning, original-law originalism does not give us any 
standards to assess the other structural and precedential 
arguments, and certainly none to weigh them against each other. 
Even if Blaisdell is wrong about the text, it could very well be right 
about the other arguments and thus be correct. It is hard to see how 
the standards of original-law originalism could render the decision 
in Blaisdell false. 
Wickard v. Filburn concerned whether amendments to the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 could apply to the production 
and consumption of homegrown wheat.195 Roscoe Filburn grew 
wheat on his farm to feed to his livestock. However, he grew more 
wheat than was allotted to his acreage of farmland by the Act, and 
was penalized accordingly.196 He challenged the application of the 
Act to his overproduction on the basis that he did not sell the wheat, 
and therefore was not subject to federal regulation under the 
Commerce Clause.197 The district court enjoined the penalty.198 The 
Supreme Court then took up the case, holding inter alia that the Act 
was a constitutional exercise of the Commerce Clause power.199 In 
 
 189. Id. at 420–22. 
 190. Id. at 447–48. 
 191. Id. at 425. 
 192. Id. at 426 (stating that the Contract Clause is written in general terms, with 
“construction . . . essential to fill in the details”). 
 193. Id. at 435–36 (holding that the state police power is primary compared to the 
Contract Clause and thus state powers must be harmonized with the Contract Clause). 
 194. Id. at 436–37 (analyzing cases). 
 195. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 114–15 (1942). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 116–17. 
 198. Id. at 116. 
 199. Id. at 133. 
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so doing, the opinion made a textual argument appealing to the 
“necessary and proper” Clause,200 drew upon precedent,201 
referenced the prudential outcomes of the case,202 and set forth a 
structural argument about judicial role.203 Again, all of these forms 
of argument are familiar to our practice of law and would have 
been familiar at the founding. And, as before, there are no 
discernible standards from original-law originalism to evaluate the 
arguments themselves or against each other and thus to determine 
that Wickard is false. 
Taking stock, original-law originalism is a thesis that offers very 
little meaningful content. As a thesis about interpretive 
methodology, any opinion that uses any modern conventional 
arguments—including textual, historical, precedential, doctrinal, 
prudential, structural, or ethical arguments—falls under the 
umbrella of original-law originalism. It seems to cover almost all 
opinions that would be reasonably written in a common-law 
jurisdiction. As a thesis about the validation and falsification 
conditions, it is nearly as empty. Insofar as the arguments proffered 
are of normative originalist vintage, then original-law originalism 
can import those standards for their validation or falsification. 
However, if there are any other arguments employed that do not 
aim at original meaning, employing other original methods, 
original-law originalism has very little to offer. Moreover, original-
law originalism has no further standards on how to compare 
arguments of different type against each other. The only validation 
or falsification standards that are on offer are ones that must appeal 
to the standard theoretical questions, including those which 
concern our moral, linguistic, and interpretive commitments—
precisely what the positivist originalist enterprise was designed  
to avoid. 
C. There Is No Good Evidence for Original-Law Originalism 
Finally, the evidence for original-law originalism is 
inconclusive and, indeed, there is strong evidence against original-
law originalism. As discussed, Baude and Sachs appeal to both 
 
 200. Id. at 119. 
 201. See, e.g., id. at 122–23. 
 202. Id. at 124–28. 
 203. Id. at 129. 
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higher-order practices and lower-order practices.204 As higher-
order practices, they reference the attribution of authority to the 
framers, the lack of any acknowledged rupture in the legal order, 
and the continued usage of the institutions created by the original 
Constitution.205 And as lower-order practices, Baude and Sachs 
appeal to the fact that in Supreme Court decisions originalism  
takes decision-making priority and that there is an absence of  
anti-originalist cases.206 
As they recognize, the higher-order practices do not solidly 
point to anything.207 Indeed, all of these higher-order facts are 
obviously consistent with even pluralist interpretation. You could 
be a pluralist and have reverence for the framers as thinkers—and 
indeed you might have thought that they were pluralists or 
amenable to pluralist interpretation.208 You need not think the 
move to pluralism necessitates any “rupture” in the legal order, as 
the evolution could have been and could continue to be smooth. 
And you could value many of the continuing institutions, while 
gently changing them to the extent necessary. 
The lower-order practices do not do much to help. First, 
consider whether Supreme Court opinions actually show the 
priority of originalism. As an initial point, we have to be clear on 
what “originalism” means: Does it mean normative originalism 
(with all the myriad old and new variants) or original-law 
originalism?209 If it is the former, then it seems false. As we  
 
 204. The nature of the distinction between higher-order and lower-order practices  
is underspecified in Baude and Sachs’s account. It is unclear whether the distinction itself  
is important, or whether it is simply a way of organizing different data that  
supposedly support positivist originalism. See Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, supra note 7, 
at 2354, 2365, 2391. 
 205. Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, supra note 7, at 2366–70; Sachs, Legal Change,  
supra note 7, at 844–45. 
 206. Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, supra note 7, at 2372–86; Sachs, Legal Change,  
supra note 7, at 837–38 (citing Baude’s manuscript approvingly for this proposition). 
 207. Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, supra note 7, at 2365; Primus, supra note 10, at 49 
(questioning the higher-order evidence). 
 208. See, e.g., Stephen M. Feldman, Constitutional Interpretation and History:  
New Originalism or Eclecticism?, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 283, 283 (2014) (“In the early decades, 
numerous Americans—including framers, Supreme Court justices, and constitutional 
scholars—used an eclectic or pluralist approach to constitutional interpretation.”). 
 209. Baude is unclear on this point. When discussing evidence for original-law 
originalism, Baude focuses on inter alia the priority of original meaning in various opinions, 
suggesting that he is referencing normative originalism. Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 
supra note 7, at 2372–76. But then he concludes, “inclusive originalism appears to have the 
highest priority.” Id. at 2376. 
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have seen, Brown and Bolling, among others, provide strong 
evidence that the Court did not in fact use an interpretive 
methodology that strongly prioritized original meaning. These are 
indeed examples of anti-originalist cases. Here, the response that 
both opinions were supportable with normative originalist 
thinking is not enough, because the question is what the Court 
actually did.210 Moreover, it is unclear how this helps Baude and 
Sachs because they are arguing that our law is original-law 
originalism, not normative originalism. 
If the point is that Supreme Court opinions show the priority of 
original-law originalism—as broadly defined as it is—then as 
shown above, it is unsubstantiated211 or vacuous.212 Baude seems to 
contend that any reference to original meaning or text evinces an 
original-law originalist methodology.213 But this commits the 
mistake of ambiguation: pluralist methodologies can, and often do, 
take advantage of arguments from text and original meaning.214 
This then leads to the fundamental point: How do we know that 
judges are employing original-law originalism as a methodology 
rather than something else, such as a pluralism that holistically 
weighs disparate goals? For example, it could be that judges are not 
tracking original-law pedigree, but are simply offering different 
ways of supporting their conclusions. They offer varieties of 
arguments, including those appealing to text and original meaning, 
but also prudence and structure, in their pluralism. And it could be 
that when they appeal to prior cases, they are trying to appeal to 
methods that have withstood the test of time and are thus accepted 
and practicable. 
 
 210. Baude also points to the fact that in explicit conflict, normative originalist 
arguments on text and original meaning usually trump other forms of argumentation. But 
that is not dispositive evidence of normative originalism. Rather, that is consistent with 
pluralism that has a strong presumption for text and original meaning—which is the 
prototypical variety of pluralist interpretation. 
 211. Primus, supra note 10, at 49 (challenging the lower-order evidence). 
 212. Segall, supra note 129, at 51. 
 213. Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, supra note 7, at 2376–86 (arguing cases were not 
nonoriginalist based on references to original meaning in the cases). 
 214. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, supra note 2, at 24. Indeed, pluralists will likely appeal 
to text in some fashion, as there will generally always be some plausible argument at a high 
enough level of abstraction, especially given the inclusion in the text of general concepts like 
“liberty” and “due process.” See, e.g., Peter J. Smith, How Different Are Originalism and Non-
Originalism?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 707, 709 (2011) (suggesting that at a high enough level of 
abstraction the newest forms of originalism and nonoriginalism converge); Colby, New 
Originalism, supra note 2, at 740 (same). 
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But if that is possible, then Baude and Sachs must admit that 
their lower-order evidence for original-law originalism is inert. 
Baude and Sachs might respond that such a pluralist method is 
embraced by original-law originalism, but then original-law 
originalism is just a stand-in term for legal reasoning and again 
proves to be a vacuous thesis.215 
Another issue is the treatment of aberrant data that counsels 
against original-law originalism. Specifically, Baude and Sachs 
speak of constitutional interregna, wherein our law was not 
original-law originalist.216 But they contend that, regardless, today 
our law is original-law originalist.217 
This circumvention is suspect. Baude and Sachs bracket off 
important periods of jurisprudential development under the term 
“interregnum”—such as the New Deal, Warren, and parts of the 
Burger Courts. But these periods, and their resulting decisions, are 
very much part of our law today. Blaisdell, Wickard v. Filburn, Brown, 
Miranda,218 Gideon v. Wainright,219 and Roe v. Wade (the 
“nonconforming cases”), for example, are benchmarks of our law, 
both in adjudicatory disputes and the way our society operates. It 
might be true that now that we have these benchmarks, we can use 
original-law originalist methodology, including stare decisis and 
precedent, to continue deciding cases. But then our law is not 
original-law originalism. Our law is original-law originalism plus 
the nonconforming cases—because that is actually what best 
describes our practice of law.220 And if that is the case, it is this 
law—call it exceptional original-law originalism—that is our law 
and deserves our dutiful obedience. However, that conclusion 
should be concerning for Baude and Sachs, because such a law 
would seem to allow for future exceptions in difficult cases. 
 
 215. Baude and Sachs might also respond that this is an empirical question that requires 
more data. But that too is unpromising, because it is hard to see how original-law originalism 
and pluralism would come apart. Given how capacious original-law originalism is defined, 
it would seem to embrace any variety of accepted good reasoning that a pluralist would be 
apt to utilize. 
 216. Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, supra note 7, at 2389; Sachs, Legal Change,  
supra note 7, at 848–49. 
 217. Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, supra note 7, at 2389; Sachs, Legal Change,  
supra note 7, at 848–49. 
 218. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 219. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 220. Primus, supra note 10, at 60 (“The only form of originalism that our practices 
clearly embody is a form riddled with ‘errors’ [that is, non-conforming cases] of this kind.”). 
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Determining whether a case is exceptional in this way may appeal 
to lots of different nonconforming considerations—as it did in the 
New Deal, Warren, and Burger Courts. This, in turn, opens the door 
to question whether this law is not simply the law of the interregna, 
at least in difficult cases. 
In sum, the evidence that Baude and Sachs proffer does not 
support that original-law originalism is our law. Both the higher-
order and lower-order evidence is completely compatible with 
other interpretive methodologies, like pluralism or pragmatism. 
And insofar as original-law originalism embraces these other 
interpretive methodologies, it is a vacuous thesis. Finally, the 
recognition of constitutional interregna, in which important 
benchmark cases were decided pursuant to nonconforming 
interpretive methodologies, completely undercuts the proposition 
that our law is original-law originalist. 
V. THE OBLIGATION TO FOLLOW THE LAW CANNOT SUSTAIN 
POSITIVIST ORIGINALISM 
The projects of positivist originalism and original-law 
originalism have serious problems in their use of positive 
observations to generate a meaningful theory of law. I focus on two: 
First, at best, the theory’s conclusion is too weak to ground a 
meaningful theory of law that does not appeal to other theoretical 
questions. This point embraces Conclusions 1 and 2,221 but suggests 
that they are not sufficient to establish a distinctively originalist 
theory. Second, their justification is highly indeterminate, such that 
other competing explanations better explain our law, and deciding 
between them will require appeal to theoretical questions.  
This point challenges Conclusion 1, showing that positivist 
originalism is unsupported. 
A. Too Weak a Conclusion 
Revisiting the schematization of Baude and Sachs’s argument, 
recall that the ultimate conclusion is that officials have a prima facie 
duty to apply original-law originalism. To this point, Baude states, 
“It is generally agreed that judges have some kind of prima facie 
obligation to remain within the bounds of the law—whatever those 
 
       221.    See text accompanying supra notes 107–108. 
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bounds may be.”222 But he adds, “This duty is not at all absolute. 
[I]t is possible that a judge’s duty to follow the law can be 
outweighed in some cases by more pressing moral concerns.”223 
It seems that, when viewed as a theory of adjudication,  
original-law originalism does little to uphold originalist 
commitments. The structure of Baude and Sachs’s argument does 
not tell us very much about how much weight the prima facie duty 
to follow original-law originalism is. That may be beyond their 
project, but notice the arising difficulty. In theory, prima facie 
duties might be outweighed by rather minimal contrary duties. 
And as recognized, if original-law originalism can be trumped by 
other arguments that sound in the broad sphere of morality, then 
that means some prudential arguments, some structural 
arguments, or some ethical arguments may carry the day in a 
particular case.224 However, this sounds a lot like many plausible 
pluralist interpretive theories of adjudication.225 They give weight 
to the text and original meaning, but are open to them being 
outweighed by other arguments that may sound in other 
considerations, such as welfare and contemporary moral norms. 
Thus, the original-law originalist judge cannot bypass theoretical 
questions, including about political morality and our normative 
commitments, in determining whether to apply the original 
meaning of the law in a particular case. The judge must probe the 
theoretical questions for answers to determine whether their 
obligation to apply the law requires applying original meaning. 
Baude argues that this still shifts a significant burden to  
non-originalists. He writes, 
 
 222. Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, supra note 7, at 2392. 
 223. Id. at 2395. 
 224. Even if we understood the obligation as pro tanto and not merely prima facie, the 
same analysis would hold true. See supra note 108. The problem for Baude and Sachs’s theory 
is that the obligation to apply original meaning can be overweighed by other 
considerations—and that is true of both pro tanto and prima facie obligations. 
 225. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Our Principled Constitution, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1325 
(2018); Fallon, supra note 167. 
David Strauss’s living constitutionalism arguably offers less weight to text and 
original meaning. Strauss observes that text and original meaning rarely dictate the result in 
constitutional cases. But that is seemingly because issues before the Court often do not 
squarely implicate the text of the Constitution. Strauss seems to recognize that if the text was 
on point, then arguments from text would have weight. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING 




For instance, if it turns out that all judges openly decide cases on 
the basis of astrology, it does not follow that astrological judging 
is morally obligatory, or even morally defensible. Astrology 
might be so irrational that its conventional legal status is 
irrelevant. So[,] if originalism is as irrational as astrology, 
presumably judges should ignore originalism even if it is the 
law. . . . But notice how much the positive turn has transformed 
the normative question. Rather than asking whether originalism 
is the best way to constrain judges, or whether it will maximize 
human welfare in the long run, we are now asking whether it is 
as bad as astrology. That is a burden of proof that most originalists 
would be happy to rise to.226 
This misunderstands the dialectic. Suppose the opponent 
proposes a good replacement theory—such as a pluralist theory that 
gives original meaning and text weight but allows for prudential 
and ethical arguments to trump after a holistic weighing. The 
opponent contends that any prima facie duty is outweighed, in 
particular instances or perhaps whole, by the possibility of getting 
to, say, better results in terms of political morality. The burden 
remains on (original-law) originalists to show that any prima facie 
duty to apply the original meaning of the law is not outweighed by 
the potentiality of better results. That is precisely the burden that 
originalists had prior to the entry of positivist originalism and 
original-law originalism. And to carry that burden, the positivist 
originalist must confront and answer the same theoretical 
questions as before. In Baude’s words, we are still asking,  
among other things, “whether originalism is the best way to 
constrain judges, or whether it will maximize human welfare in the  
long run.” 
B. Better Theories of Our Law 
A final serious concern arises even if we agree with the 
positivist originalist project generally in generating a theory of our 
law from our practices and assuming that the prima facie moral 
duty to comply with our law is somehow meaningful. That 
problem is that original-law originalism does not have a monopoly 
on explicating what our law is. There are obvious competitors that 
are just as good, if not better. 
 
 226. Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, supra note 7, at 2396. 
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Of course, I could observe that original-law originalism makes 
no serious attempt to explain the data that Legal Realism is 
correct.227 But that might devolve into exchanges about contingent 
matters of our law, like what some opinions actually held and 
whether such distinctions are meritorious. Rather, I examine a 
claim that Baude and Sachs contend to be true: that original-law 
originalism sets some falsification conditions.228 As discussed, 
Baude and Sachs set forth a number of cases that are (potentially) 
incorrectly decided under original-law originalism. That is not to 
say they do not employ the original-law originalist methodology, 
but if they do, they get it wrong. I have provided reason above to 
doubt these falsification conditions, but let us grant Baude and 
Sachs that they are meaningful. So, for example, let us agree that 
Blaisdell is incorrectly decided under original-law originalism. But 
what is undeniable is that Blaisdell is actually part of our law. It is a 
Supreme Court case that has not been overruled. The social facts of 
our law validate Blaisdell as part of the law; for example, when 
relevant, judges decided cases in accordance with Blaisdell. 
Now, consider the interpretive theory of original-law 
originalism + Blaisdell. That theory arguably does a better job  
of explaining our law, because not only does it account for 
everything original-law originalism does, it accounts for Blaisdell 
too. Ergo, it may be this theory to which officials are prima facie 
obligated to apply and follow. And, indeed, we could string  
the nonconforming cases with +-signs to get better theories, which 
may lead to a fairly exceptional original-law originalism. As I  
argue above, that result is problematic for the original-law 
originalist, because that resulting theory generates questions  
about whether future exceptions are warranted, and that may result 
in what is functionally a form of pluralist (or otherwise 
nonoriginalist) adjudication.229 
 
 227. Segall, supra note 11, at 313–14; see also, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, 
Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 
823 (2006) (applying empirical analysis to conclude that judicial political ideology affects the 
application of Chevron deference); Matthew Sag, Tonja Jacobi & Maxim Sytch,  
Ideology and Exceptionalism in Intellectual Property: An Empirical Study, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 801, 
847 (2009) (finding “ideology is a significant determinant of whether an individual justice 
will vote for or against an IP owner”). 
 228. Of course, I have painstakingly argued that this is not the case, but for this 
argument, I take Baude and Sachs on their own terms. If they concede that there are no 
falsification conditions, I think that is damning in itself. 
 229. See supra Section IV.C. 
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Baude and Sachs could resist this conclusion, by arguing that 
original-law originalism is still a better explanation of our law than 
my proposed ad hoc chicanery. They cannot appeal to explanations 
of the ground data (i.e., results of cases)—their theory will lose on 
explanations of the data, because the +-sign theories better explain 
the ground data. They could, however, question the explanatory 
value of the +-sign theories. In so doing, they could appeal to other 
desiderata of explanations: that an explanation should be simple 
and not ad hoc; that it provide coherent and consistent answers; or 
that it should preserve some other background commitments, such 
as moral, linguistic, or interpretive commitments.230 But appeals to 
these considerations raise a serious problem for Baude and Sachs: 
Appeal to these desiderata of explanations sound in theoretical 
questions about the law, and are not empirical, historical questions 
about the law. Consider determining simplicity and ad hoc-ness. 
Deciding whether original-law originalism’s simplicity is worth 
failing to preserve purportedly aberrant decisions, like Blaisdell, is 
not a matter of empirical, historical question. It’s a question about 
how important the result in Blaisdell is, what kind of impact it has 
on our society, and what our world would be like without it. To see 
this, imagine the query, but instead of Blaisdell, it is Brown. 
Confronting that query, we would likely opt for the +-sign theory—
that preserves Brown at the expense of explanatory simplicity and 
lack of ad hoc-ness—because preservation of Brown is a critical test 
of the moral worth of a theory. The same is true of Blaisdell, though 
the stakes might be lower and the answer different. Nevertheless, 
the theoretical questions have to be answered. Similarly, when 
deciding whether original-law originalism preserves important 
background commitments better than the +-sign theory, we are 
explicitly referencing the background commitments—which 
generally sound in the theoretical questions, like moral, linguistic, 
or interpretive ones.231 
 
 230. Leiter, supra note 136, at 1239. 
 231. See Primus, supra note 10, at 60 (observing that deciding between original-law 
originalism and error-riddled originalism “would require other kinds of arguments” dealing 
with theoretical questions). 
I note that there is no obvious reason why simplicity is better, in the face of poorer 
performance in accounting for the data. Simplicity may be used in this context as a tool to 
persuade a consensus to give up the aberrational results, like Blaisdell and the other 
nonconforming cases. But that is not a positivist enterprise; that is law reform. 
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VI. THE SAME OLD PROBLEMS REMAIN 
Thus, positivist originalism and original-law originalism have 
not fulfilled the promise of a new way forward in thinking about 
the law. They do not bring to bear any novel insights arising from 
legal positivism and indeed fail to fully embrace legal positivist 
commitments. Original-law originalism does not meaningfully 
describe our legal practice, failing to provide any historical or 
empirical conditions to legitimate what is our law without appeal 
to theoretical questions. Moreover, positivist originalism and 
original-law originalism, as theories of adjudication, are not 
substantially distinct from forms of interpretive pluralism and 
cannot be sustained without appeal to the theoretical questions 
they were designed to avoid. 
But perhaps, positivist originalism and original-law originalism 
still offer improvements over normative originalism. Here too, 
however, the case is unconvincing. The main concerns are that the 
justifications for originalism—that it results in greater notice, 
predictability, and stability and that it cabins judicial discretion—
are illusory, and that the costs of originalism are great in that it fails 
to preserve our law. Positivist originalism and original-law 
originalism do little to solve these problems.232 
A. No Good Consequences 
Consider the consequentialist aims of normative originalism: 
increased notice, predictability, and stability; and cabined judicial 
discretion. None of these are furthered by original-law originalism. 
The capacious variant of original-law originalism—the only one 
that has hope in describing our law—allows all sorts of arguments, 
and it has no meaningful way to decide between them. Thus, the 
public has no better notice, no better ability to predict the law, and 
no greater confidence that the law will remain stable than with any 
 
 232. Of course, Baude and Sachs may rightly complain that these were never  
their stated aims. To this, I cannot object, but I think it is still worthwhile to complete  
the circle and show that there are no such benefits to positivist originalism and  
original-law originalism. 
As discussed above, supra Part I, there are conceptual arguments for originalism as 
well. Those arguments are not strengthened by positivist originalism—which eschews 
consideration of such theoretical conceptual questions. Insofar as positivist originalism 
proffers a conceptual case—that, say, relates to our prima facie obligation to follow the law 
as it is—such a case fails for the familiar reason that such an obligation does not support a 
meaningful positivist originalism or is meaningless. 
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nonoriginalist theory, such as pluralism. Indeed, the lack of 
validation and falsification conditions means that there is no way 
to rein in judicial discretion beyond nonoriginalist interpretive 
methodologies.233 In sum, original-law originalism is no better than 
any nonoriginalist theory, in terms of the consequentialist aims that 
motivated normative originalism. 
B. The Lack of Preservation of Our Law 
Finally, and perhaps most devastating, positivist originalism 
and original-law originalism do not convincingly preserve our law. 
As seen, under the more stringent version of original-law 
originalism, it is too narrow to capture even stare decisis and 
precedent, and thus utterly fails to preserve our practice of law. 
Under the expansive version, it does not provide meaningful 
validation or falsification criteria. So, in one sense, that means 
original-law originalism does not invalidate any of our fixed stars: 
Brown, Bolling, Miranda, Roe, and the like. 
On the flip side, however, this lack of meaningful validation 
and falsification criteria also means that original-law originalism 
does not clearly falsify blatantly incorrect decisions. For example, 
consider a new decision that invalidates Brown, Bolling, Miranda, or 
Roe. If the opinion were to use conventional arguments in justifying 
these results, it is unclear how the original-law originalist criteria—
which are supposedly empirical and historical—could invalidate 
the decision. And of course, we can imagine such a decision, 
because each of these decisions were watershed moments, that 
changed the nature of the constitutional landscape. So, a decision 
that would return to a prior time would certainly have a legitimate, 
plausible claim to being more in accord with original meaning. 
Thus, the only way to adjudge the new decision, that invalidates 
our fixed stars, as incorrect would be by appeal to the theoretical 
questions that original-law originalists aim to avoid. In a similar 
vein, consider a decision that reaffirms the terrible decisions of 
 
 233. The restrictive variant fares better, but still poorly. Even under the restrictive 
variant, we have no good way to determine how to judge between arguments from different 
modalities—say, between original meaning and the discursive form of stare decisis. Sharp 
lawyers can craft opposing arguments that will still leave us scratching our heads about how 
to validate the law. 
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Korematsu,234 Plessy v. Ferguson,235 or Lochner.236 Again, if the opinion 
made use of the right types of argumentation, it is unclear how 
original-law originalism could falsify it. And here, such an 
argument is clearly in the offing, for the opinion could appeal to the 
Supreme Court’s prior precedent. However, a theory of 
interpretation that cannot tell us that these cases are false simply 
does not describe our law.237 As a result, the problem of preservation 
still plagues positivist originalism and original-law originalism. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has shown that positivist originalism and  
original-law originalism fail in their main aims of describing our 
practice of law with empirical, historical validation conditions for 
the law and providing a meaningful theory of adjudication. 
Positivist originalism and original-law originalism depart from 
legal positivism in ignoring key social facts, that sound in 
theoretical normative, moral, and interpretive questions. Thus, 
positivist originalism is left with a choice: grapple with theoretical 
questions, or formalistically ignore them at the expense of accuracy. 
Moreover, as factual matter, original-law originalism fails to 
describe our law, as key features of our law have greatly evolved 
since the founding. Thus, either original-law originalism does not 
preserve key features of our law or it is a capacious interpretive 
methodology, that fails to provide meaningful validation or 
falsification conditions of what is our law. Furthermore, as a theory 
of adjudication, positivist originalism and original-law originalism 
are not substantially different from forms of interpretive pluralism, 
and thus do not merit the originalist label. Moreover, insofar as 
they stake a claim to being a better theory of our law, that claim 
cannot be sustained without appeal to the theoretical questions 
they were designed to avoid. 
 
 234. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 235. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 236. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 237. Even if original-law originalism did have some meaningful validation or 
falsification criteria, it is still important to recognize that the original methods of stare decisis 
and precedent do not do much work to preserve the law. While stare decisis and precedent 
allow us to keep Blaisdell and Wickard and other such cases that were wrongly decided under 
original-law originalism, they would not allow us to decide them in the first place. And that 
really does not preserve our actual practice of law. This again tells us that our law is not 
original-law originalism, but rather at best original-law originalism with significant 
exceptions, from some interregna periods. 
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The famous refrain often heard from originalists is that “[i]t 
takes a theory to beat a theory.”238 Thus, the positivist originalist 
might ask: Aren’t these problems for positivist originalism and 
original-law originalism ones for all theories of interpretation? 
What’s your theory to beat this theory? 
Apart from observing that this is a variety of tu quoque,239 the 
nonoriginalist opponent has further ripostes. As a descriptive 
theory of our law, theories that embrace the reality that theoretical 
debates are part of our law, such as Legal Realism, will provide a 
better explanatory account of our law. And insofar as positivist 
originalism is capacious and embraces these theoretical debates as 
relevant to the content of the law, the nonoriginalist’s best response 
is perhaps silence, recognizing that positivist originalism is no 
theory to defeat. It is not a distinctively originalist theory that 
privileges original meaning in fixing the law. Rather it resembles a 
theory that the nonoriginalist might have championed. 
In a similar vein, as an adjudicative theory, the nonoriginalist 
again can freely assent. If positivist originalism recognizes that the 
obligation to apply the original meaning as the law is defeasible, 
with the possibility that arguments of different modalities, some 
sounding in political morality, might trump, the nonoriginalist has 
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